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  Considerable theoretical and empirical debate has addressed the effects of 
minimum lot size zoning regulations on the development of land.  The direction of this 
relationship certainly has relevance for policy.  Previous studies have used econometric 
techniques to estimate this relationship.  This paper uses a land use share multiple 
regression model in which the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
acres developed from 1990-2000 to acres not developed over the same time period.  It 
builds on previous studies by using a weighted average minimum lot size variable rather 
than a simple dummy variable and by explicitly considering the change in developed land 
area in the dependent variable.  The study area is Oakland County, Michigan, a suburb of 
Detroit that is experiencing significant suburban development.  Results show that there is 
a quadratic relationship between average minimum lot size and land development.  At 
first, development declines with minimum lot size, but at a diminishing rate.  Then, at 
approximately 5.15 acres (224,330 square feet), development begins to increase with 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
Across the United States, land use is becoming more and more decentralized as 
people move away from cities into suburbs and rural areas in search of their American 
Dream.  The situation is much the same in Oakland County, Michigan, where the land-to-
population growth ratio from 1960-1990 was twelve to one (Michigan Land Use 
Leadership Council 2003).  This suburbanization has numerous consequences for society.  
Every unit of land that is developed for human use simultaneously represents a unit of 
land the environmental benefits of which are compromised or completely foregone.  The 
opportunity costs of developing land are many and varied—lost farmland, species habitat, 
and environmental amenities are among the most commonly cited (Benfield, Raimi, and 
Chen 2001).  Other negative effects include central city decay and the rising fiscal costs 
of providing infrastructure to an ever more decentralized society.  This is compounded by 
the fact that development tends to be permanent and/or irreversible, and that it is unlikely 
that the land can or will ever be “undeveloped.”     
What can society do to regulate this phenomenon?  Communities looking to 
combat such sprawl style development are in need of policy options that can control 
growth.  But policies also need to be sensitive to a wide range of interest groups.  
Developers, planning and zoning officials, and local citizens are among the many interest 
groups that have a stake in how we choose to control growth.   
In the United States, zoning is one, nearly ubiquitous method of land use control.  
Historically, it has been used as a means of protecting property owners from those 
nuisances (i.e., negative externalities) that arise when incompatible land uses are located 
in close proximity to one another.  Increasingly, it is also described as a policy tool that is   2
useful for controlling urban growth (Fischel 1990).  Minimum lot size restrictions, the 
workhorse of most residential zoning ordinances, are now often mentioned as a growth 
control tool.  However, both theory and empirical evidence are unclear about the 
direction of the relationship between lot size restrictions and land use change.  Some 
claim that minimum lot size zoning restrictions actually exacerbate sprawl development 
(Field 2001).  The direction and magnitude of this relationship is an empirical question, 
and research is needed to address it.            
In studying land use change, applied economists have conducted empirical 
research projects examining those factors that are hypothesized to contribute to the 
decentralization of society (For example, Irwin, Hsieh, and Libby 2002; and Spalatro and 
Provencher 2001).  These models generally consider how various factors affect land 
prices (hedonic models) or the quantity of land consumed in development (land use 
quantity models).  Zoning restrictions, when they are incorporated in these models, are 
usually included as explanatory dummy variables that affect either the price of land or the 
amount of land that is consumed by developed uses (e.g., Jud 1980; Mark and Goldberg 
1986).  In regards to zoning, the results of these studies are mixed and inconclusive.  
There is certainly a need to expand upon this limited body of empirical evidence.   
The townships, cities, and villages of Oakland County, Michigan, have 
traditionally been bedroom communities for people that work in the City of Detroit.  
Today, however, Oakland County is also one of many rapidly suburbanizing areas in the 
United States.  As the population of Detroit has declined, much of it has relocated to 
suburban Oakland County (SEMCOG 2004).  Land uses vary a great deal within the 
county, and so do the types and strictness of zoning policies used to control it.  Oakland   3
County therefore represents an excellent study area in which to examine the effects of 
zoning restrictions on land development.    
Given this background, this paper attempts to estimate and interpret the 
relationship between minimum lot size zoning and land development in Oakland County, 
Michigan using a land use share multiple regression model.  The model presented here is 
an extension of previous research on the relationship between development and zoning in 
that it uses the weighted average minimum lot size in each community as an explanatory 
variable rather than the simple dummy variable that is often used.  It also explicitly 
considers land use change in the dependent variable over a discrete period of time (1990-
2000).    
The analysis will proceed in the following manner.  Chapter 2 begins by 
discussing the theoretical underpinnings of urban growth and the concept of sprawl 
development.  It then examines the observed pattern of urban growth and development in 
the United States, Michigan, and Oakland County, and how zoning ordinances regulate 
land use.  Chapter 3 is a literature review that considers previous research on the 
relationship between zoning and land consumption.  In particular, it provides a 
conceptual model of land use change and a review of several major types of commonly 
employed empirical models.  Chapter 4 describes the model specification used in the 
present study, while Chapter 5 discusses the data sources.  Chapter 6 is a presentation and 
discussion of the model’s results.  Finally, Chapter 7 provides some conclusions.          
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Chapter 2  Problem Background 
 
2.1   Introduction 
The previous chapter provided a brief introduction to the land use issue of 
suburbanization, the relationship between land development and residential zoning 
restrictions, and the general objectives of this research.  This chapter will provide a basic 
understanding of why suburbanization is occurring, a definition of sprawl, and the basic 
trends in land consumption in the United States and Michigan.  Following this will be a 
subsection that describes the basics of zoning restrictions.  While not exhaustive, by 
helping to understand the nature of the issue, this background will provide a basis for the 
remainder of the paper.   
2.2  Theories of Suburbanization 
 
Suburbanization is a process in which households (and firms) migrate from the 
central city to the suburbs (Lopez, Adelaja, and Andrews 1988).  Mieszkowski and Mills 
(1993) discuss the common misconception that suburbanization in the United States is 
strictly a post World War II phenomenon.  They show that suburbanization began prior to 
World War II in the United States, and that it is an international trend—the populations of 
most developed countries are now 60 to 80 percent metropolitan.   
They describe two theories of the process of suburbanization in the United States.  
The first is the natural evolution theory.  Here, employment opportunities are clustered in 
the central business districts (CBD) of cities and residential development occurs from the 
center outward.  In the interests of minimizing the costs of commuting, central areas 
develop first.  As land near the CBD is consumed, development moves into the suburbs.  
High-income people will then move from the city to suburban areas where it is possible   5
to have larger houses and more amenities.  This leaves low-income individuals living in 
the city center, and thus low and high income families have a tendency to become de 
facto geographically segregated.  A central assumption of this theory is thus that high-
income individuals prefer large single-family properties to small multi-family properties.  
In other words, there is a high income elasticity of lot size.  Transportation, and 
especially the automobile and the freeway, is also central to this theory because it allows 
for the possibility of commuting over long distances.  
The above is also known as the pull theory of suburbanization.  This is because 
certain aspects of living outside of the city, such as lower crime rates, newer 
infrastructure, and greater environmental amenities, attract people to live farther away 
from the city center.   
The second theory of suburbanization proposed is based on the fiscal and social 
problems of cities that may drive affluent residents out of the city center.  For example, 
high taxes, poor public schools, crime, and congestion are all serious inner city problems 
that may lead high-income individuals to move to the suburbs.  This “flight from blight” 
by the wealthy leads to further deterioration of the city as the tax base is eroded.  This is 
also known as the push theory of suburbanization (the converse of the pull theory) 
because it is based on factors that make living in the city less attractive.  Table 1 lists 
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Table 1: Push and Pull Factors 
Push Factors  Pull Factors 
High Crime  Safe Neighborhoods 
Poor/Deteriorating Infrastructure New  Infrastructure 
Poor Schools  Quality Schools 
Declining Property Values  Rising Property Values 
Poverty Large  Homes/Properties 
Lack of Employment Opportunities  Many Available Jobs 
High Taxes  Lower Taxes 
Physical Congestion  Open Space 
   
The “flight from blight” theory is a generalization of the well-known Tiebout 
model (Tiebout 1956).  Tiebout wished to deal with the problem of market failure that 
results from an inability to exclude people from enjoying public goods.  This non-
excludability allows individuals to enjoy the benefits of public goods without revealing 
the intensity of their true preferences for them (Fischel 1985).  Tiebout hypothesized that 
dividing public goods into two varieties—local and national—could solve this problem.  
In a situation with many local governments and a mobile citizenry, citizens will “vote 
with their feet” and choose to live in the community that provides them with the best 
overall package of public goods.  This creates a market for public services like zoning at 
the local level.  While Tiebout did not apply his theory to land use issues specifically, it is 
easy to see how it applies.  When the wealthy flee from the city, they are simply 
revealing a preference for a different package of public services that is available in the 
suburbs.       7
Mieszkowski and Mills also note that there are many interactions between these 
two models, and thus it is difficult to make an empirical claim that one or the other is the 
correct theory.  For example, the effects of relative income on the residential location 
decision are evident in both explanations, as is the tendency of the affluent to move to the 
suburbs.  In reality, a combination of the effects predicted by each theory probably drives 
suburbanization.     
2.3  Suburbanization and Sprawl    
    
When suburbanization reaches the point at which it is deemed excessive, it is 
often pejoratively termed to be “sprawl.”  While sprawl has only become a major public 
policy debate in the last 20 or so years, the term has long been used in the social sciences.  
In the economics literature, for example, “urban sprawl” was used as early as 1965 
(Harvey and Clark).  There has always been difficulty, however, in defining exactly what 
sprawl is.  
We know that sprawl is growth that is excessive in nature.  What is not clear is the 
answer to the question: when does development become excessive?  Judging when this 
actually occurs is the crux of the problem.  Anthony Downs (1998) provides some 
general characteristics of urban sprawl.  These characteristics include: low-density 
development, leapfrog development, reliance on private automobiles for transportation, 
and lack of centralized land use planning.  Of these characteristics, leapfrog development 
may need further description.  It is defined as a development pattern in which growth 
occurs noncontiguously, so as to leave large vacant areas between patches of 
development.       8
From an economic perspective, determining the threshold at which growth 
becomes excessive is a matter of calculating costs and benefits.  When individual 
households make a location choice, they decide by weighing their private benefits against 
their private costs while ignoring any external costs they may create (Wassmer 2001).  
Possible private benefits of living in a suburban area include lower costs of land, better 
schools, lower crime rates, larger homes, increased availability of jobs, and nearer 
proximity to open spaces.  These benefits are the “pull factors” described above.  Possible 
private costs of living in the suburbs include increased time spent commuting and 
increased distance from urban amenities.  A necessary condition for choosing a location 
is that its private benefits must be greater than its private costs if a household is to choose 
to reside there.  The sufficient condition is that the site finally chosen must have larger 
net private benefits than any other available location.   
Growth also has numerous environmental and fiscal costs associated with it 
(Benfield, Raimi, and Chen 2001).  Environmental costs include increased automotive 
emissions and energy consumption from longer commutes, loss of prime farmland
1, 
negative health effects, and the often irreversible loss of environmental amenities.  Many 
of these environmental costs are externalities and thus are not considered by individuals 
as they make location decisions, even though they are relevant to society as a whole.  
When the marginal social costs of choosing a certain location become greater than 
associated marginal social benefits, then growth is excessive from an economic 
perspective and can be deemed sprawl.  Given the difficulties of quantifying external 
                                                 
1 Between 1982 and 2001, the United States lost 22.1 million acres of farmland, a decrease of 
approximately 10 percent (NRCS 2003).     9
costs and benefits, it is clearly useful to consider the physical manifestations of sprawl 
described above when attempting to define it.       
Benfield, Raimi, and Chen (2001) provide an overview of several studies that 
investigate the fiscal costs of sprawl.  The various studies consistently note that sprawl-
style development is more expensive than more compact development.  Fiscal costs 
examined in these studies include school overcrowding, rising infrastructure costs (for 
water and sewer, roads, and energy), and residential construction costs.  The rising cost of 
infrastructure brought on by sprawl is an intuitive result.  Because low-density 
development entails increased distances between businesses and homes, additional 
infrastructure is needed to connect it all together.     
Fischel (1985) points out that the most obvious cost of sprawl is the time spent 
commuting to work, as well as in traveling to stores, recreation facilities, and schools.  
Another important cost is the loss of agglomeration economies.  These are the benefits 
that accrue to firms and households as a result of being located in close physical 
proximity to each other.  Goods and services can be produced and made available in 
greater quality and quantity when firms and households are clustered together in cities.  
This is actually one reason that cities exist; agglomeration economies allow us to increase 
our standard of living.  But when a firm chooses to leave the city in favor of suburbia, it 
only accounts for the internal effect that the loss of these agglomeration economies has 
on itself.  In doing so, it imposes an external cost upon those firms that remain in the 
central city because those firms experience a decline in benefits from agglomeration 
economies (Fischel 1995).    
   10
2.4  Suburban Growth in the United States 
 
The data in Tables 1 and 2 below comes from the 2001 Natural Resources 
Inventory (NRI).  It is conducted by the Natural Resources Conservation Service 
(NRCS), a division of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).  Previously, 
data was collected every five years starting in 1982, but beginning in 2001 data is now 
collected yearly for a smaller sample size (NRCS 2003).   
Table 2 illustrates major land uses in millions of acres beginning in 1982 and 
ending in 2001.  There is clearly a downward trend in the “Cropland,” Pastureland,” and 
“Rangeland” categories.  This is not surprising as this has been the trend for most of the 
United States’ history, and is mostly due to increases in agricultural production efficiency 
and therefore does not threaten the United States’ agricultural production base (Vesterby 
and Krupa 1997).  It is the “Developed Land” category that is somewhat troubling.  
Between 1982 and 2001, developed land increased by 33.5 million acres.  This is an area 
approximately the size of Illinois (NRCS 2003).  It represents a 46 percent increase in 
developed land over a 19-year period.  Over the similar time period of 1980 to 2000, the 
US Census reports that population grew from 226.7 million to 281.4 million people.  This 
is an increase of 24.1 percent.  Given these statistics, it is clear that per capita land 
consumption is increasing.  
Table 2: Major Land Use by Year in the United States, in Millions of Acres 
  1982 1987 1992 1997 2001 
Cropland  420.4 406.2 381.6 376.4 369.6 
Pastureland  131.4 127.2 125.4 119.5 116.9 
Rangeland  414.5 409.3 405.9 404.9 404.7 
Forest Land  402.6 404.4 403.6 404.7 404.9 
Other Rural Land  48.3 48.6 49.8 50.3 51.4 
Developed Land  72.8 79.0 86.5 97.6 106.3 
(NRCS 2003)   11
A recent study that analyzed the extent of sprawl growth in the United States’ 
urbanized areas (as defined by the Census Bureau) confirms the result that increases in 
per capita land consumption are a major contributing factor to suburbanization 
(Kolankiewicz and Beck 2001).  This study defined sprawl as “the rural acres lost as an 
Urbanized Area spreads outward over a period of time” (p. 7).  It found that two factors, 
per capita sprawl and population growth, are the driving forces of sprawl as defined.  
They define per capita sprawl as an increase in the amount of urban land consumed per 
resident, and population growth as simply an increase in the number of residents in a 
geographic area.  This is a rather straightforward result: sprawl results from more 
individuals consuming more land.       
Table 3 is a further breakdown of the “Developed Land” category described in 
Table 2.  Here we see that most of the increase in developed land (approximately 92 
percent of it) over the period came in the “Large Urban and Built-Up Areas” category.  
“Large Urban and Built-Up Areas” are defined as those developed areas greater than 10 
acres in size.  This is clearly the area in which most of the United States’ increase in land 
consumption is occurring.     
Table 3: Developed Land by Type and Year, in Millions of Acres 
  1982 1987 1992 1997 2001 
Large Urban and Built-Up Areas  46.9 52.6 59.6 69.8 77.6 
Small Built-Up Areas  4.7 5.1 5.4 6.1 6.7 
Rural Transportation Land  21.2 21.3 21.5 21.6 22.0 
Total Developed Land  72.8 79.0 86.5 97.5  106.3 
(NRCS 2003)   12
The USDA’s Economic Research Service (ERS) also produces data on land use 
(Vesterby and Krupa 1997).
2  Table 4 below shows the change from 1980 to 1997 of 
urban and rural residential and nonresidential areas.  Here we can see that both urban and 
rural residential areas have increased significantly over the time period, but that the 
annual change in rural residential area is nearly 2.5 times greater than that of urban 
residential area.  Much of this difference is due to the fact that large lot sizes are more 
common in rural areas than in urban areas.  Table 4 also shows that urban nonresidential 
area is growing while rural nonresidential area is declining.  Because the ERS is defining 
“urban” based upon population density, this occurred partially because previously “rural” 
areas are reclassified as “urban” when their density increases sufficiently.            
Table 4: Change in Urban and Rural Residential and Nonresidential Area 
 1980  1997  Annual  Change
Area (Million Acres) 
 
Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural 
Residential area 
 
29 56  85 36 73  109  0.42  1.03 
Nonresidential 
 
18 2,160  2,178 30 2,124  2,154  0.66 -2.10 
Totals 
 
47 2,216  2,263 66 2,197  2,263  1.07 -1.07 
(Vesterby and Krupa 1997) 
 
2.5  Suburban Growth in Oakland County, Michigan 
The national growth trend described in the previous section is also the prevailing 
trend in Michigan.  Table 5 illustrates the urban expansion that has occurred in Michigan 
between 1960 and 1997 in thousands of acres.  It shows that over the period 1990 to 
1997, Michigan experienced an 11 percent increase in urban area (Vesterby and Krupa 
1997).         
                                                 
2 The ERS data includes federal land and the State of Alaska, both of which are omitted from the NRI.     13
Table 5: Michigan Urban Area (1,000 Acres), 1960-1997 
1960 
 
1970 1980 1990 1992 1997 
1,017 
 
1,286 1,540 1,705 1,760 1,896 
(Vesterby and Krupa 1997) 
 
The study by Kolankiewicz and Beck (2001) discussed above specifically looks at 
four Michigan urbanized areas: Detroit, Flint, Grand Rapids, and Lansing-East Lansing.  
Table 6 reproduces their findings for these four areas. The number in parentheses next to 
each urbanized area represents that area’s rank in square miles sprawled (out of the 100 
U.S. cities examined).  The column labeled “Sprawl Factors Percent Growth” provides 
population and per capita land consumption growth data on a percentage basis for the 
period 1970 to 1990.  “Overall Sprawl” gives the percent growth in land area and the 
total increase in square miles of area that occurred over the period.  The “sprawl 
apportionment” column separates the effects of the two sprawl factors—per capita sprawl 
and population growth—in order to see the relative importance of each for a given city.      
Table 6: Sprawl in Michigan’s Urbanized Areas, 1970-1990 
Sprawl Factors Percent 
Growth 























Detroit (18)  -6.9%  37.9%  28.4%  247.4  0.0%  100.0% 
Flint (71)  -1.2%  72.1%  69.9%  67.4  0.0%  100.0% 
Grand 
Rapids (65) 
23.7% 23.4%  52.7%  77.0  50.3%  49.7% 
Lansing-East 
Lansing (95) 
15.5% 16.4%  34.5%  25.3  48.7%  51.3% 
(Kolankiewicz and Beck 2001) 
 
  Of these cities, Detroit and Flint are of relevance to Oakland County because 
they lie in close geographic proximity to it.  Detroit proper is directly to the South in   14
Wayne County, and much of Oakland County is included in the Detroit urbanized area.  
Flint proper is located directly to the Northwest of Oakland County in Genesee County.
3  
Detroit and Flint are also of particular interest because they fall into a class of cities with 
negative population growth that still managed to spread outwards.  As Table 6 shows, 
increases in per capita land use were entirely responsible for sprawl growth in both the 
Detroit and Flint urbanized areas.  There were 11 such urbanized areas included in this 
study.
4  As a group they had an average percentage increase in total urban land of 26 
percent.  Clearly urban expansion can occur without population growth.  This means that 
if Detroit and Flint proper wish to combat sprawl, they need to focus their policy efforts 
on its per capita land consumption component.  It is also important to note that population 
growth still exists in many of Detroit’s suburban communities, as the following analysis 
will show.              
Data produced by the South Eastern Michigan Council of Governments 
(SEMCOG 2002) predicts population growth rates for all communities (townships, cities, 
and villages) within Livingston, Macomb, Monroe, Oakland, St. Clair, Washtenaw, and 
Wayne counties.
5  Table 7 presents the population of these seven counties in 1990 and 
2000, their 2030 expected population, and the percent growth from 2000-2030.  Wayne 
County, where Detroit is located, is the only county in the group exhibiting an expected 
negative population growth rate.  The other counties all have positive expected 
                                                 
3 The terms Detroit proper and Flint proper refer to those cities as they are legally defined.  In contrast, the 
Census Bureau often describes heavily populated areas as “urbanized areas” that are defined by the central 
city plus the closely settled urban fringe around the city.  “Urbanized area” is the definition used in 
Kolankiewicz and Beck (Kolankiewicz and Beck 2001).        
4 The other nine cities are: Akron, Ohio; Buffalo-Niagara Falls, New York; Cleveland, Ohio; Dayton, Ohio; 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin; New York City-N.E. New Jersey; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Scranton-Wilkes-
Barre, Pennsylvania; and Youngstown-Warren, Ohio.   
5 SEMCOG’s forecast are produced by the REMI (Regional Economic Models, Inc.) and METROPILUS 
(Metropolitan Integrated Land Use System) models (SEMCOG 2001).     15
population growth rates ranging from 11.7 percent in Oakland County to 80.0 percent in 
Livingston County.  It is clear from the data that while Wayne County is a traditional 
population center (with Detroit constituting its core), it is in relative decline as compared 
to the other counties.  These numbers are consistent with a pattern of urban migration that 
moves outward from the historical population center (Detroit) to less populated regions.  
Table 7: SEMCOG County Member Projected Population Growth Rates 
 Population   
County  1990  2000  2030 (Expected) % Growth Expected 2000-2030
Livingston 115,645  156,951  282,552  80.0% 
Macomb 717,400  788,149  930,420  18.1% 
Monroe 133,600  145,945  196,554  34.7% 
Oakland 1,083,592  1,194,156 1,333,537  11.7% 
St. Clair  145,607  164,235  203,255  23.8% 
Washtenaw 282,934 322,895  448,020  38.8% 
Wayne 2,111,687  2,061,162  2,013,975  -2.3% 
Total 4,590,465  4,833,493  5,408,349  11.9% 
(SEMCOG 2002) 
 
Within Oakland County (and the other counties as well), SEMCOG also provides 
data on expected population growth for 59 individual townships, villages, and cities.
6  
This data is provided in Appendix Table 1.  Percent expected population growth varies a 
great deal in Oakland County, ranging from –19.1 percent in Ferndale to 344.5 percent in 
Lyon Township.  The mean expected percent growth over this time period is 17.7 
percent.  For a full set of summary statistics, see Appendix Table 2.    
While these percentages vary considerably, by mapping them (see Figure 1) one 
can see that low and negative percentages are generally geographically clustered together 
in Oakland County’s older neighborhoods.  The communities in the South East quadrant 
of Figure 1 (delineated by the heavy black line) represent Detroit’s more traditional 
                                                 
6 Oakland County actually contains 61 municipalities.  The SEMCOG data only specifies 59 of these 
because it is based on traffic analysis zones rather than political boundaries.  Data for Novi and Novi 
Township are thus combined, as are Southfield and Southfield Township.     16
Oakland County suburbs.  It is obvious from the map that growth rates are significantly 
larger outside of this area.  This pattern is consistent with a trend of suburban expansion 
at the fringe and contraction at the center.  For summary statistics that show this pattern 
more clearly, see Appendix Tables 3 and 4. 
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2.6 Zoning 
 
Zoning can be roughly defined as “the division of a community into districts or 
zones in which certain activities are prohibited and others are permitted” (Fischel 1985, 
p. 21).  It prescribes what type of development may be undertaken in each zone as well as 
what may not be undertaken.  Zoning is thus a very powerful means of land use control 
because it provides the legal power to completely exclude certain uses.  However, zoning 
is not meant to be a growth control in that it is not usually aimed at curbing sprawl 
growth.   
Originally, zoning laws created a hierarchy of land uses, on the top of which stood 
single-family residential housing.  Today, this hierarchy of protection no longer formally 
exists, but many still retain the belief that residential uses should be protected above 
others.  In general, contemporary zoning ordinances are aimed at separating incompatible 
land uses.  For example, industrial parks are typically prohibited from locating in 
residential areas, and vice versa.  The general goal of zoning is to control the negative 
externalities that would inevitably result from such a land use mix (Field 2001).     
The authority to zone was originally confirmed in the United States Supreme 
Court decision Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).  The Euclid 
decision established that in protecting the public welfare from nuisance
7, the 
constitutionally provided police power affords the necessary legal justification for 
zoning.  Zoning laws were determined to be reasonable in general as long as they were 
based on comprehensive expert plans of community development.  Essentially, this 
                                                 
7 The legal definition of nuisance is “a condition or situation (such as a loud noise or foul odor) that 
interferes with the use or enjoyment of property” (Gardener 1999).       18
means that zoning laws are acceptable as long as community planning and zoning experts 
find that they support the general health and welfare of society.   
The zoning power originally resides with the States, but in Michigan enabling acts 
delegate the authority to zone to local jurisdictions.
8  Michigan retains the power to 
withdraw zoning authority from local jurisdictions, but this rarely occurs.  Today, nearly 
every local government in the United States either actively zones or has the authority to 
zone.  
Various Michigan enabling acts have transferred the state power to zone to county 
and municipal (township, city and village) levels (Daneman, Decker, and Horn 2002).  
The situation is much the same across the country, as local authorities have traditionally 
controlled zoning.  Michigan’s power to transfer zoning authority to local governments 
was upheld in City of Rochester v. Superior Plastics, 192 Mich. App. 273 (1991).  In this 
case the court confirmed that Rochester had the power to set a maximum permissible 
noise level for an industrial zone located in close proximity to a residential zone, and that 
this power is derived from the zoning enabling act. 
The Institute for Public Policy and Social Research (IPPSR) at Michigan State 
University recently completed a survey of planning and zoning in Michigan (McGrain 
and Baumer 2004).  Table 8 illustrates the extent of zoning in Michigan.  It shows that 
approximately 75 percent of communities have a zoning ordinance.  IPPSR notes that an 
additional 13 percent are subject to county zoning.  Much of the remaining 12 percent 
consists of urban counties in which local governments are more likely to conduct zoning 
                                                 
8 Michigan is thus known as a “Dillon Rule” state because the local government is granted authority by the 
State.  There are also “Home Rule” states in which authority rests with local authorities unless specifically 
prohibited by the state (Richardson, Gough, and Puentes 2003).     19
independent of county government.  It also shows that nearly all cities and villages have 
passed zoning ordinances.   
Table 8: Adoption of Zoning Ordinances in Michigan 
Type of Community   
Zoning Ordinance Adopted? City Village Township County 
 
Total
Yes  265 186  797  25 1,273 
No  1 38  325  58  422 
Total  266 224  1,122  83 1,695 
(McGrain and Baumer 2004) 
Several major types of zoning requirements can be distinguished.  They are: 
minimum lot area and width, type of use to which the lot may be put (e.g., agricultural, 
residential, industrial, and commercial), maximum building height, maximum units per 
lot, minimum setbacks, and parking requirements (Fischel 2000).  In general, they 
represent restrictions on the size and density of developments, as well as restrictions on 
type of use.  Other types of restrictions also exist, but those listed are relatively 
ubiquitous.  Among them, minimum lot size zoning is the restriction most commonly 
examined in statistical zoning studies (Fischel 1985).  This is because it is the most 
frequently used method of regulating residential population density, and hence it is 
amenable to statistical analysis. 
Anas, Arnott, and Small (1998) discuss the possibility that minimum lot size 
zoning can be a factor in the process of excessive suburbanization.  Because minimum lot 
size restrictions are essentially a control on population density, if they are set too high 
they can have the unintended consequence of adding to sprawl.  This is described in Field 
(2001) in terms of the identity: 
NH A NH A × ≡    (1)   20
This simply means that total residentially developed area,  A, equals the product of the 
number of homes ( NH ) and the area consumed by each home ( NH A ).  Minimum lot 
size restrictions tend to increase the NH A  term, and therefore increase A.   
This process can be exacerbated if zoning is exclusionary in nature.  Exclusionary 
zoning is zoning that makes certain land uses impossible or only allows for a token 
amount of that use (Gardener 1999).  For example, when municipalities do not have a 
zoning district for high-density, residential development because they wish to exclude 
low-income residents who cannot afford to purchase larger properties, they are practicing 
exclusionary zoning.  These lower income families would pay lower property taxes than 
high-income residents but still receive full access to locally provided public goods if they 
were allowed to reside in the given community.  If a government is motivated to exclude 
these low-income individuals, then they may do so with large minimum lot sizes that in 
turn could exacerbate sprawl.   
Figure 2 depicts a frequency distribution of the number of households that would 
optimally prefer to buy land at different lot sizes (Adelaja 2004).  This distribution is 
hypothesized to be bell-shaped for several reasons.  First, as income rises, so does the 
ability to afford larger lots, and therefore rising income is a push factor with respect to 
increasing demand for large lot sizes.  But the price of land, which is inversely related to 
lot size, is a factor that must also be considered.  Larger lot sizes are more expensive, and 
therefore frequency of ownership of large lot properties will be lower.  Thus, at some 
point, specifically the peak of the frequency distribution, lot size frequency begins to fall 
due to the rising price of land.  Thus, the rising price of land is a mitigating factor in land 
consumption.        21














Given the above frequency distribution, total land consumption can be defined as: 
∑ ⋅ =
n
i i LS i N CONS    (2) 
where i N  is the number of buyers at the i
th lot size and i LS  is the i
th lot size (Adelaja 
2004).  Therefore, if a very high minimum lot size is set at point A in Figure 2, then total 
land consumption will be  ∑
≥
⋅
A i i LS i N .  Moving the minimum lot size restriction from 
point A to point B will thus increase total land consumption.  Figure 3 below maps the 
resulting implied relationship between minimum lot size and land consumption.  It 
clearly shows that as minimum lot size increases, land consumption decreases, although 
in a nonlinear fashion.  This result runs counter to that described by Anas, Arnott, and 
Small (1998) and Field (2001).  It is different because it accounts for the fact that while 
Number of Households 
Lot Size  Median  A B  22
higher minimum lot sizes increase the amount of land consumed per individual, they also 
limit the total number of individuals that are able to participate in the market.  
Figure 3: Relationship between Land Consumption and Minimum Lot Size 
   







   
  Finally, we can calculate the rate of change in consumption of land (as a result of 
a change in minimum lot size) by finding the partial derivative of consumption with 
respect to minimum lot size (i.e.,  MLS
CONS
∂
∂ ).  This yields the quadratic relationship 
depicted in Figure 4 (Adelaja 2004).  At first the rate of change is declining, but it 
eventually turns and begins to increase.  Thus, to the right of the point at which Figure 4 
is minimized, increases in minimum lot size begin to increase the rate of change in land 
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Figure 4: Relationship between Minimum Lot Size and the Rate of Change in 
Consumption 
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Chapter 3  Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2 the basic theories and trends in suburbanization were discussed, and 
the relationship between zoning constraints and land use was described.  This was done 
with the goal of providing some background on the nature of the debate regarding the 
relationship between zoning and land development.  In this chapter, previous empirical 
research is examined and summarized to provide a basis for a study of the effect of 
zoning on land development in Oakland County.   
There are numerous examples of studies examining how zoning laws affect urban 
growth and development.  These works are both conceptual and empirical.   Empirical 
works tend to be of two major types.  First, there are those that focus on how zoning 
affects housing and land values or prices.  These price effects subsequently influence the 
expected returns of individual land parcels and therefore influence the likelihood of 
conversion to a new land use.  Second, there are those studies that use econometric 
methods to consider land use change directly as the dependent variable.  Zoning’s effects 
on the land use market can thus be estimated with either prices or quantities.  After 
discussing a conceptual model of land use change, the two major types of empirical 
works will be discussed.    
3.2  Conceptual Model of Land Use Change 
   
Many authors (including Bell and Irwin 2002; Bockstael 1996; and Carrion and 
Irwin 2002) describe a conceptual model of an individual’s land use conversion decision 
in which the landowner maximizes either profits or expected utility.  This can be applied 
to research at both aggregated and disaggregated levels.  In general, the landowner   25
chooses to change land use when the present value of net expected returns in the 
proposed use is greater than the present value of net expected returns in the current use.  
The one period static version
9 of the model as given in Bell and Irwin states that the 
landowner of a parcelk in current stateu will choose a land use fork at timet that 
maximizes net expected returns.  Therefore, parcel k in state u will be converted to 
stater in time t if the net returns are greater than those of converting to all other land uses 
u j ≠ (where j could also represent maintaining the current use).  Mathematically, the 
condition is expressed as  
J j u kjt R u krt R ,..., 1 ; | | = ∀ ≥    (3) 
where u krt R | equals the net expected returns to state u .  Net expected returns are a 
function of a variety of variables that are hypothesized to affect the landowner’s decision 
to convert to a new land use.  For example, access to water and sewer infrastructure is 
likely to influence net expected returns to a residential use. 
The above decision rule for land use conversion is very simplified.  Other, more 
complex models, have been created to capture the dynamics of the development process 
(For example, Fujita 1982; Turnbull 1988; Tegene, Wiebe, and Kuhn 1999).  These 
models attempt to account for the long-term nature of land use decisions explicitly.  In 
particular, expectations about future development (issues of irreversibility and 
uncertainty) and changes in markets are of importance in the dynamic context.  For the 
purposes of this analysis, however, only a simple static model is necessary.   
                                                 
9 The model can also be expressed over many periods or infinite periods.  The major difference is that the 
timing of development becomes important, and discount rates must be included in the analysis (Bell and 
Irwin 2002).   26
While this simple static model is based on micro level decision making, it can still 
be applied to aggregate analyses.  Yet there is an important tradeoff between aggregated 
and disaggregated modeling approaches that should be noted.  One major advantage of an 
aggregate analysis is that, compared to a disaggregated approach, it may do a better job 
of endogenizing price changes and externalities because they will be encompassed within 
the aggregation.  A disadvantage of aggregation is that much of the data’s richness and 
detail may be lost.  Both disaggregated and aggregated data can be used in models based 
on this static conceptual approach.  These two situations are described in the following 
empirical models.    
3.3 Empirical  Models 
 
3.3.1  Hedonic Zoning Models     
 
Consider the first major type of empirical model.  Many studies have attempted to 
measure the effects of zoning on the price of land or housing (e.g., Mark and Goldberg 
1986; McMillen and McDonald 1993; Asabere and Huffman 1997; and Spalatro and 
Provencher 2001).  This type of study generally estimates a hedonic price function in 
which one or more of the explanatory variables represent zoning policies.  They thus 
attempt to measure the significance of zoning regulations by estimating prices rather than 
quantities.  A typical hedonic price study would hypothesize that the price of housing or 
land (P ) is a function of a vector of housing structural variables (S
v
), a vector of 
neighborhood variables ( N
v
), a vector of accessibility variables ( A
v
), a vector of policy 
variables (Z
v
), and a normally distributed stochastic error term (ε ) (Perman et al. 2003).  
The values of each of these factors are capitalized into the price of land.  In zoning 
studies, Z
v
will represent a vector of zoning restrictions.  For example, the equation   27
i i Z i A i N i S i P ε τ δ γ β α + + + + + = v v v v v v v v
   (4) 
is a linear hedonic price function that includes all of the factors listed, as well as the 
intercept termα .
10  Structural variables are factors like number of bedrooms and square 
footage of living space.  Neighborhood variables include factors like crime rate and 
school quality.  Accessibility variables will account for the distance to employment 
centers and recreation.  The coefficient vectors— , , , δ γ β
v v v
and τ v—consist of the implicit 
prices of each of the variables.  They illustrate the change in price that occurs given a 
marginal change in any individual variable, holding all else constant.   
If a zoning variable is statistically significant, then there is evidence that zoning 
policies can alter the expected returns to specific parcels of land, and therefore can have 
an effect on the developer’s decision to convert to a different use (Irwin, Hsieh, and 
Libby 2002).  The problem, then, is to find the direction and magnitude of this 
relationship between price and zoning policy, and then examine how this would affect the 
landowner’s decision to convert.  Yet as simple as this may sound, these hedonic models 
have yielded inconsistent results that provide few generally applicable conclusions.   
For example, Mark and Goldberg (1986) investigate the argument that zoning is 
needed to control for negative externalities in the housing market.  Zoning laws are 
generally designed to eliminate the negative externalities that tend to emerge when 
markedly different land uses are in close proximity to one another.  They use time series 
analysis to estimate individual hedonic equations for each of 24 years in two different 
neighborhoods (a total of 48 equations).  Sets of zoning dummy variables were included 
to measure the effects of zoning classification (e.g., commercial, industrial, residential, 
                                                 
10 It is also common to use a double-log or semi-log model specification.  If double-log is used, then the 
coefficient estimates of logarithmically transformed variables can be interpreted as elasticities.   28
etc.), neighboring and adjacent non residential land uses that could possibly affect a 
home’s value, and whether or not a rezoning of the parcel had occurred during the period 
of the study.  They test three major hypotheses: (1) zoning classification affects housing 
price consistently over time, (2) sale prices fall when non single-family uses are 
permitted, and (3) sale prices rise when rezoning allows for higher densities and different 
uses.   
Results provide little support for the first hypothesis.  Zoning classification only 
sometimes affects sale price, but this is inconsistent over time.  The second hypothesis is 
also not supported.  Non single-family uses are shown to have both positive and negative 
price effects over time.  The third hypothesis is not at all supported.  The effects of 
rezoning on housing prices are inconsistent in that coefficients are sometimes estimated 
as positive and sometimes estimated as negative, depending on the year.  Authors provide 
no explanation of what causes these temporal inconsistencies.  In sum, these results are 
interpreted as meaning that zoning cannot be justified simply as a tool for dealing with 
negative externalities because these externalities do not exist, and also that zoning 
sometimes affects housing prices but the size and direction of these effects is inconsistent 
over time.   
In contrast to Mark and Goldberg’s results, Spalatro and Provencher’s (2001) 
study of minimum frontage zoning on Wisconsin lakefront properties finds that these 
restrictions do have significant price effects.  Minimum frontage zoning limits the 
subdivision of property by requiring that all lakefront homes have some minimum 
amount of lakefront.  For example, if the minimum frontage restriction is 100 feet, then a 
property with less than 200 feet of frontage cannot be subdivided.     29
The authors hypothesize that this restriction induces both an economic loss in 
value due to its development-constraining effects and an economic gain in value due to 
its environmental amenity-preserving effects.  The development effect is hypothesized to 
lower the value of land (by decreasing marginal willingness to pay) by restricting the 
flow of private goods and services otherwise available from the property.  The amenity 
effect is hypothesized to increase homeowner utility.  People will have higher willingness 
to pay when zoning regulations preserve environmental amenities like scenic views and 
water quality.  This increases their willingness to pay for lakefront property and thus the 
value of the property rises.   
Estimation of the hedonic function for Wisconsin lakefront properties illustrated 
that the development effect was negligible, while gains from the amenity effect were 
substantial.  On balance, then, the minimum frontage zoning policy raised property 
values.  Thus, the authors conclude that if this type of zoning were extended to other 
areas, it would likely increase their lake front property values as well.       
Another hedonic study that found significant price effects from zoning policies 
was conducted in Charlotte, North Carolina (Jud 1980).  Two explanatory dummy 
variables are defined to measure the relationship between zoning and market price per 
square foot.  The first of these is set equal to one (zero otherwise) if the property is zoned 
exclusively single-family residential.  The second zoning variable is set equal to one 
(zero otherwise) if the property has a minimum lot size restriction of greater than or equal 
to 15,000 square feet (0.34 acres).   
Results show that the single-family residential zoning variable is significantly and 
positively correlated with the price of single-family housing.  The estimated positive   30
relationship is interpreted as being a result of the security that owners have in knowing 
with certainty that their neighbor’s land use options are also limited.  Because most 
neighboring properties probably fall under the same zoning classification, individuals 
know that they are shielded from possible future negative externalities.  This is analogous 
to the amenity effect described in the Wisconsin Study in which positive price effects 
were interpreted as resulting from the environmental preservation stemming from 
minimum frontage restrictions.  However, one might also hypothesize that a negative 
relationship exists between these two variables because the residential zoning 
classification could lower property values by limiting the owner’s land use options.  This 
would be analogous to the development effect described in the Wisconsin study.    
 It is also shown that the minimum lot size zoning variable has a significant and 
negative relationship with price.  This is interpreted as being a result of zoning regulators 
setting minimum lot sizes above the market equilibrium, which leads directly to an 
increase in the supply of large lot residential property and a corresponding decrease in 
price.  An alternative explanation of this negative relationship could be that the 
development effect is experienced as a result of the minimum lot size restriction limiting 
the landowner’s development options.   
Fischel (1990) has criticized Mark and Goldberg and similar studies because they 
assume that zoning is an exogenous variable.  In an ordinary least squares model, if a 
right hand side variable is endogenous, then parameter estimates will be biased and 
inconsistent (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998).  Realistically, the local politicians that 
usually make zoning decisions face pressures from a diversity of interest groups 
including homeowners (both current and potential), developers, and environmentalists.    31
Those who make zoning policy do not make their decisions in isolation from the local 
political process.  In fact, through the variance process, potential builders can often get 
certain zoning requirements waived, calling into question their general effectiveness.  If 
zoning is not binding, then it will have a diminished effect on housing prices.  For a 
conceptual model and empirical study of zoning that addresses the endogeneity issue, see 
Gottlieb and Adelaja (2004). 
Another important criticism made by Fischel (1995; 1990) of the Mark and 
Goldberg study (as well as similar studies finding that zoning does not capitalize into 
home values) is that it fails to account for the censored-sample problem.  In claiming that 
zoning is not justified because there are no externalities for it to prevent, the authors 
simply fail to account for those externalities that zoning has already prevented.  The 
study thus does not consider those negative externality producing land uses that zoning 
actually prevented the construction of, and thus the interpretation that no externalities 
existed in the first place is probably mistaken. 
Fischel (1995) also discusses what were termed the development and amenity 
effects in the study of Wisconsin lakefront zoning restrictions, although he uses different 
terminology.  The distinction between developed and vacant land is of central importance 
when examining these price effects.  For already developed residential properties, he 
shows that the positive amenity effect will be greater than the negative development 
effect because current homeowners probably have no expectation that they will ever 
change the land use of their property, thus making the development effect negligible.  
This means that homeowners will in general favor zoning regulations because they 
increase property values.  But the situation is different for undeveloped, vacant   32
properties.  Here, landowners have an expectation that they will be able to develop their 
properties to the most profitable uses.  Zoning inherently limits these options, and hence 
lowers that value of vacant properties via the development effect. 
If it is assumed that homeowners are wealth maximizers and that they have 
enough political clout to dominate other interest groups, then they will use their political 
strength to support zoning laws that increase the values of their residential properties 
(and, therefore, zoning is endogenous).  The passage of stricter zoning laws will thus 
favor current homeowners (at least up to some threshold level), but be detrimental to 
owners of vacant land.   
Given the above results, it is possible that zoning laws can contribute to the 
process of excessive suburbanization commonly known as sprawl.  If zoning increases 
the value of residential properties and decreases the value of vacant properties, then any 
new would-be developers will be inclined to purchase and develop properties in different 
jurisdictions in which development has higher net expected returns because zoning 
regulations are less strict.   Potential developers thus have two primary options.  They can 
either attempt to develop properties closer to the central city, or they can develop 
properties farther away from the central city.  When faced with this decision, it seems 
plausible that developers will choose the latter option because if they choose to develop 
in the central city they will likely have to incur the costs of demolishing whatever 
structures are already on the property.  If they choose to develop in a more rural setting 
away from the city, they will not have to face this extra cost.  In this way, zoning 
regulations can encourage decentralization.               33
As described in section 2.5, zoning regulations such as minimum lot size that 
restrict development densities can also exacerbate sprawl.  This is a simple result of the 
fact that forcing people to live at low densities by definition spreads them out over more 
area.  This simple phenomenon combined with the more complex one described above 
makes the statement that certain zoning regulations can lead to excessive suburbanization 
a strong hypothesis.   
Pogodzinski and Sass (1991) and Fischel (1990) both provide surveys and 
analyses of studies that measure the effects of zoning regulations on housing prices.  
Fischel specifically points out that empirical economic research on the effects of zoning 
regulations on price supports neither the conclusion that land use controls are ineffective 
nor the conclusion that they are unnecessary.  Rather, he concludes that they are 
important constraints and that they do affect housing values.  This contrasts with Mark 
and Goldberg’s (1986) finding that zoning only sometimes affects price but supports the 
findings of the Wisconsin and Charlotte case studies.  Both Pogodzinski and Sass and 
Fischel note the diversity and inconsistency of these hedonic studies and suggest that 
there is still much research to be done in the area.    
3.3.2  Land Use Change Models 
 
A second group of models examines land use explicitly by estimating quantities 
rather than prices in a land use market.  The first model of this type uses disaggregated 
data.  If data is available at the parcel or plot-level, then it is possible to model land use 
within a discrete choice framework.  While this is significantly more data intensive than 
the aggregated data approach, this type of model is attractive because the unit of 
observation corresponds to the decision-making unit—the parcel’s owner makes all   34
decisions regarding each of his or her properties.  A formulation for such a situation is 
easily derived from the conceptual model provided above (Bell and Irwin 2002).  First, 
we let u krt R | be composed of a present value factor, V, and a cost of converting factor, 
C, such that 
u krt C u krt V u krt R | | | − =    (5) 
Not all of the variables affecting V and C will be observable to a researcher.  
Thus, equation 3 can be rewritten in probabilistic terms and to include a stochastic 
element, η, as follows: 
) ,... 1 ; | | | | (
) ,..., 1 ; | | | | ( ) (
J j u kjt R u krt R u krt u kjt P
J j u kjt u kjt R u krt u krt R P converting P
= ∀ − ≤ − =
= ∀ + ≥ + =
η η
η η
   (6) 
This formulation can then be used to estimate either a probit or logit type land 
transformation model of the structural form 
i i X f converting P ε β + = ) ( ) (    (7) 
For the case of binomial
11 choice probit, the function ) ( β i X f  equals the cumulative 
distribution function of the standard normal distribution.  If a logit specification is 




+  where e is the exponential operator. 
The variable iis an index of cross sectional observations,β is a set of parameters to be 
estimated, X is a vector of independent variables, andε is the independently and 
identically distributed normal error term.  The dependent variable here is categorical and 
represents whether or not a particular parcel was converted to a new use or not.   
                                                 
11 Both probit and logit can also be formulated as multinomial choices.     35
Kline and Alig (2001) use a probit model to estimate the probability that forests 
and farmland in Western Oregon and Western Washington will be converted to 
developed uses.  They find that increasing population pressures will likely lead to 
continued conversion of land to urban uses, and that this tendency will be more 
pronounced in areas where farmland and cities are in close proximity to one another.  
While this analysis was not concerned with zoning regulations, it is easy to see how the 
model could be extended to examine the effects of such policies on urban growth and 
development.  One could simply redefine the equation as a binary choice between 
converting to a developed residential use and not converting.  Zoning policies would then 
be included as explanatory variables.         
Carrion and Irwin (2002) use a similar model for just this purpose.  Specifically, 
they attempt to explain sprawl development at the urban-rural fringe as a function of 
zoning.  They introduce an explanatory dummy variable representing whether or not each 
parcel is subject to a minimum lot size zoning restriction of greater than or equal to three 
acres (130,680 square feet).  After implementing a spatial probit model, the authors find 
that their zoning policy variable is negative and significant.  This implies that 
residentially zoned parcels with a minimum lot size of greater than three acres are less 
likely to be converted to developed uses.  This is consistent with results from the 
Charlotte hedonic model in which the negative relationship between price and presence 
of a minimum lot size restriction implies lower expected returns to those parcels subject 
to minimum lot size restrictions, thus making undeveloped properties less likely to be 
developed.       36
Carrion and Irwin also show that, due to the uncoordinated nature of land use 
planning among local governments, it is possible that spillover effects could exist among 
and between communities.  For example, if development in one community is deterred by 
strict local zoning policies, new developments may simply occur in neighboring 
communities that have less stringent land use controls.  Given the variety of zoning 
ordinances that exist at a local level, it is probably a strong hypothesis that these spillover 
effects exist.    
Recently, a third type of zoning study, based on the land use share model, has 
been cited in the literature (e.g., Irwin, Hsieh, and Libby 2002).  This type of model 
estimates the significance of various factors in determining the proportion or share of 
land that is allocated to various uses.  Because the land use variable is a proportion, this 
type of model is very useful in situations where only aggregate land use data is available.  
The county is thus a common level of investigation.  This model type is based on a 
logarithmic transformation of the already described logit model.  The binomial 
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Here, i P is the probability that a given piece of land is in a given use in jurisdiction i.  
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We then substitute the observed share, i y , for the expected share, i P , and add a stochastic 













ln    (10) 
The dependent variable is thus the natural logarithm of the ratio of the share of 
land in use i y to the share of land in use ) 1 ( i y − .  This binomial land use share model is 
easily extendable to the multinomial case in which more than two land uses are 
considered.  A major advantage of this specification is that it is linear in parameters so 
estimation proceeds via ordinary least square (OLS) rather than by maximum likelihood 
as is required in the nonlinear probit and logit models.  It is also easier to correct for 
autocorrelation (both spatial and non-spatial) and heteroskedasticity with a linear model 
specification.     
In the standard logit model from which the land use share model is derived, 
estimated coefficients are difficult to interpret.  It is therefore common to compute 
marginal effects by taking the partial derivative of the expected value of the dependent 
variable with respect to each explanatory variable ( i X DEP E ∂ ∂ ) ( ).  For the binomial 
logit model, this is then interpreted as the effect of a marginal change in the explanatory 
variable on the probability that the dependent variable is equal to one (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld 1998).   
In the land use share model, i y can be interpreted as a proxy for the probability of 
development that is captured by the logit model.  It is therefore necessary to make an 
analogous adjustment if one wishes to know the marginal effects of a change in any i X  
on i y .  In both models, therefore, we are ultimately concerned with how changes in the 
explanatory variables affect the likelihood of  i y .   For the binomial land use share model,   38
these marginal effects can be expressed as  () ( ) β y y
i dX
i dy
ˆ ˆ 1− =  where  y ˆ is the predicted 
value of  y calculated at the means of all explanatory variables (Greene 1993).  The s ' β  
are thus proportional to the marginal change in the likelihood of  i y (i.e.,  i dy ) because 
they are all multiplied by the same constant of proportionality.  For example, if  1 β  is 
twice as large as 2 β , then a marginal increase in 1 X increases the probability of 
development by twice as much as a marginal increase in 
2 X . 
Plantinga, Mauldin, and Miller (1999) use such a binomial land use share model 
to estimate the costs of carbon sequestration in Maine, South Carolina, and Wisconsin.  
Other studies (Wu and Segerson 1995; Hardie and Parks 1997; Miller and Plantinga 
1999) use similar model specifications to examine a diversity of land use issues.  Again, 
it is easy to see how zoning policy variables could be introduced into their models.   
Irwin, Hsieh, and Libby (2002) conduct such an analysis.  They estimate a land 
use share model using county level data from Ohio to examine the question of how rural 
zoning affects the relative allocation of urban to undeveloped land, i.e.,  ) 1 ( i y i y − where 
i y is equal to the share of developed acreage in each county and  i y − 1  is the share of 
undeveloped acreage.  Taking the natural logarithm simply represents a monotonic 
transformation of this variable.  Rural zoning is defined as zoning that is controlled at the 
county and township level, as opposed to the municipal level (city and village).  Two 
explanatory zoning variables are defined.  They represent (1) the proportion of land in 
each county that is governed by township level zoning regulations and (2) the proportion 
of land in each county that is governed by county level zoning regulations.  For example,   39
for variable (1) if 40 percent of the land in a county is under township jurisdiction, then 
the variable is specified as “0.4.”  The authors also specifically consider the possibility of 
the occurrence of spillover effects in which growth is pushed from one community to 
another as a result of zoning policies.  To capture these effects, two additional zoning 
variables are included.  The first is a weighted average proportion of land in county 
zoning from neighboring counties.  The second is a weighted average proportion of land 
in township zoning from neighboring counties.       
In considering the possibility of spillover effects among neighboring 
communities, the authors posit a simple model in which two jurisdictions, A and B, are 
neighbors (see Figure 5).  Initially, there is no zoning in either jurisdiction, and the 
markets for urban land in each are in equilibrium.  Zoning regulations can alter these 
equilibria by causing demand shifts, supply shifts, or a combination of the two.  
Figure 5: Neighboring Communities 
   40
They then consider the effects of two different types of zoning in community A.  
First, open space preservation zoning that restricts development is considered in Figure 6.  
Clearly, such a policy will decrease the supply of land in A, thus increasing price and 
decreasing quantity of land.  Due to substitution effects, this supply constriction in A 
should lead to a demand increase in B as potential homeowners move to where 
regulations are least stringent. This would also increase the price of land in jurisdiction B 
as well as the quantity of land.   













A second policy, nuisance zoning, could also be implemented in community A 
with the goal of separating incompatible uses and thereby eliminating negative 
externalities.  This situation, shown in Figure 7, should increase the demand for urban 
land in A.  However, prices in A will rise as a result, and price substitution could push 
potential buyers into B, thus shifting the demand curve in B.  It is also possible that the 
increased amenity values that result from the nuisance zoning in A could be greater than 
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this price substitution effect.  Because this cross-amenity effect counters the price 
substitution effect, the net result is ambiguous.   









There is also another possibility not discussed in the above analysis.  Consider a 
situation in which A has a relatively less restrictive zoning policy than B.  Ceteris 
paribus, demand for urban land should be relatively higher in A than in B.  The resulting 
development in A (including jobs, shopping, etc.) could then make living near A, but not 
necessarily in A, an attractive option regardless of land prices.  Hence, the quantity of 
urban land in B may also increase. 
The major empirical finding of the Irwin, Hsieh and Libby study, consistent with 
the nuisance zoning policy above, is that the existence of township level zoning increases 
the relative allocation of urban to undeveloped land both in the county and in neighboring 
counties—meaning both the township level zoning variable and the weighted average 
proportion of land in township zoning variable were statistically significant.  The 
implication of this is that township zoning encourages urbanization locally (within the 
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county) and also creates spillover effects whereby increased development occurs in 
neighboring counties.  This result corroborates the claim of Carrion and Irwin above that 
zoning can create spillover effects among communities.  The study also finds that county 
level zoning does not have a statistically significant effect on the relative allocation of 
urban to undeveloped land. 
Irwin, Hsieh, and Libby also investigate the possibility that their model is 
spatially autocorrelated.  This means that the observations have correlated error terms 
across space.  This is a direct violation of the Gauss-Markov Theorem, which states that 
the OLS error term has constant variance for all observations (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 
1998).  Autocorrelation is generally associated with time-series analysis rather than cross-
sectional analysis.  However, spatial autocorrelation of the OLS error term can be a 
serious problem in cross-sectional models because factors not observed by the researcher 
are likely to affect neighboring locations in a systematic manner (Anselin and Bera 1998, 
p. 239).  Essentially, this means that locations tend to be surrounded by neighbors with 
very similar characteristics (positive spatial autocorrelation) or with very dissimilar 
characteristics (negative spatial autocorrelation).  The authors test for this possibility and 
fail to reject the null hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation.   
In an OLS model, both spatial and non-spatial autocorrelation lead to inefficient 
but unbiased and consistent parameter estimates (Anselin 1988).  This means that 
variance is not minimized and therefore parameter estimates are not the best linear 
unbiased estimators that are assumed by OLS.  Another consequence is that the 
regression standard errors will be biased, thus invalidating hypothesis testing.     43
In order to correct the problem, a spatial weights matrix must first be constructed.  
The spatial weights matrix—W —is square, positive and symmetric.  Each column and 
row represents an observation.  The matrix elements,  ij w , are equal to 1 if the two 
locations are neighbors, and equal to zero if they are not.  It is convention to set the 
diagonal elements equal to zero (LeSage 1999).  At this point it becomes necessary to 
define what constitutes a “neighbor.”  Often those locations that share a border are 
somewhat arbitrarily defined as neighbors, although other specifications are possible. 
The next step is to define the autoregressive error structure.  For example,  
ε β + = i X i y , where µ ε λ ε + = W    (11)  
is a first order autoregressive error process whereλ is an estimated spatial autocorrelation 
parameter,ε  is a non-independent error term, andµ  is an independently and identically 
distributed error term.  Ifλ is equal to zero then clearly no autocorrelation is present.   
 Moran’s  I is one common statistic used to test for the presence of spatial 
















, where  ∑ ∑ = j ij w i S0    (12) 
where eis a vector of OLS residuals,  N is the number of observations, 0 S  is a 
standardization factor, and W is the spatial weights matrix (Anselin and Bera 1998).  
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whereI is the estimated Moran statistic, ) (I E is its expected value, and ) (I std is its 
standard deviation.  If the Z score is greater than 1.96, then there is evidence of spatial 
autocorrelation at the 95 percent confidence level.   
An iterative procedure is commonly used to correct the model when there is 
evidence of spatial autocorrelation.  First, the model s ' β are estimated via OLS and the 
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where  1 )] ( ) [( ) ( − − ′ − = Ω W I W I λ λ λ  
) (
2 λ σ Ω is a nonspherical error covariance matrix.  The third step is to take theλ just 
estimated and use it to reestimate the OLS model.  These three steps are repeated 
untilλ converges to its actual value (Anselin 1988 p. 183).   
 
                                                 
12 The concentrated log-likelihood function is derived from the log-likelihood function:  
2 2
) ( 1 ) ( ) (
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Under OLS,  I = Ω ) (λ (because  0 = λ ) and the above log-likelihood function reverts to the normal OLS 
log-likelihood function.   45
Chapter 4  Model Specification 
 
4.1  Land Use Share Model 
 
  A land use share model similar to those discussed in Chapter 3 will be used to 
examine the effects of minimum lot size zoning restrictions on land use change in 
Oakland County, Michigan.  Two major improvements are made on the specifications of 
previous models.  First, the dependent variable will explicitly consider the change in 
developed acreage over a discrete period of time (1990-2000), rather than simply 
considering cumulative development to date as a function of only current period variables 
as is done in Irwin, Hsieh, and Libby (2002).  Second, rather than using dummy 
variables, as is common in econometric models of zoning, or some other simplified 
measure of zoning, a weighted average minimum lot size variable will be used to 
examine the effects of lot size zoning restrictions on land development.  This is an 
improvement because a weighted average will capture more information than a simple 
binary dummy variable.  The use of a weighted average is also consistent with the 
specification of zoning spillover variables used in Irwin, Hsieh, and Libby.       













ln    (15) 
 
where i X  is a matrix of observed explanatory data,β  is a vector of coefficients to be 
estimated, and i ε  is a normally distributed stochastic error term.   i y  is defined as the 
change in developed acres from 1990 to 2000 divided by total undeveloped but   46
developable










= 1990 2000    (16) 
where  2000 L  and  1990 L  are total acres developed as of 2000 and 1990, respectively, 
and L is the total amount of land that is undeveloped but developable as of 1990.  More 
succinctly,  i y  is thus the share of developable acreage that was developed from 1990 to 









   (17) 
Therefore, the expression  ) 1 ( i y i y − is simply the ratio of the change in developed acres 
from 1990-2000 to acres of developable land not developed over the same time period.  
By introducing the element of change into this model, it is now more akin to the land 
transformation model than it is to the share models described in Chapter 3.        
4.2 Explanatory  Variables 
   
The dependent variable is hypothesized to be a function of economic, 
demographic, and geographic variables, as well as push/pull factors and zoning policy.  













ln (Income, School Quality, Crime, Taxes, Commute Time, Proximity to 
Population Center, Population Density, Minimum Lot Size)   (18) 
 
                                                 
13 Land is “developable,” meaning that areas that are inherently undeveloped such as lakes and rivers are 
factored out.   47
Income may be positively correlated with land development because with more 
money people can afford to purchase larger properties and build more structures.  
However, a negative relationship could also result if areas of high income use their 
affluence to prevent development from occurring in their neighborhoods.  Here, the 
interpretation is that more affluent individuals may use their money to maintain the status 
quo (and thereby protect any positive amenity values that have been capitalized into their 
property values) in their communities by preventing development.     
School quality is hypothesized to positively affect development because quality 
education systems are likely to attract new residents, and therefore new development, to a 
given area.  This is one of the “pull factors” described in Chapter 2.  It is also of note that 
the education system can be a “push factor” when it is of poor quality in a community.  
Thus, areas with poor education systems will experience less growth, ceteris paribus, 
than areas with high quality education systems.         
Crime rates are also a “push-pull factor” in that low crime rates are hypothesized 
to increase development while high crime rates are hypothesized to slow development.  
Hence, theory suggests a negative relationship between crime rates and development.   
The property tax rate is a third quality of life variable that probably affects an 
individual’s decision of where to live.  One hypothesis is that, ceteris paribus, high taxes 
and high levels of development are related because, in the long term, rapidly developing 
areas will need more revenue to provide new services (with high, up front fixed costs) to 
their citizens that were not necessary previous to the rapid development.  For example, an 
already highly developed area is likely to have its own police and fire departments 
already established, while a newly developing area may not.  Alternatively, it may simply   48
be that high taxes are a disincentive to growth, while low taxes are an incentive.  Given 
this hypothesis, less development will occur in areas with high taxes.       
Average commute time is also hypothesized to affect development.  A negative 
relationship would signify that areas with shorter average commutes are developing 
faster.  This would be consistent with the theory that time spent commuting is an 
opportunity cost of living far from jobs, and that individuals consider this when they 
make location decisions.     
Distance to population center may also affect development.  A negative 
relationship between distance to population center and development could be observed 
because as one locates further from the city, costs of travel to city jobs and to urban 
amenities increase.  This is consistent with the monocentric city model in which 
development occurs in concentric rings around the center city—prime land close to the 
city is developed first and used for high valued commercial uses while land farther away 
is used primarily for agriculture.   
While both the commuting variable and distance to population center variable are 
measures of proximity, they are different in two important ways.  First, the commute 
variable is measured in time while the distance variable is measured in miles.  Therefore, 
the commute variable accounts for traffic congestion issues while distance to population 
center does not.  Second, distance to population center is based on the assumption that 
people travel mostly between their residences and some city center.  But in modern 
society, this is often not the case, as there tend to be multiple centers of population and 
jobs to which people frequently travel.            49
Population density should also affect development.  A negative relationship (less 
density leads to more development) is hypothesized here because areas with greater 
population density are generally more developed that other areas, and therefore they have 
less potential for further development than other, less developed areas.  A negative 
relationship is also consistent with the hypothesis that individuals prefer to move to and 
live in areas with lower population densities.     
It is common in land use models to include measures of soil quality as 
explanatory variables.  Soil quality is considered to be a proxy for the opportunity cost of 
using land for developed uses.  Generally, soil quality is negatively correlated with 
development.  This is because a property’s highest valued use is more likely to be in 
agriculture if it has highly productive soils.  In Irwin, Hsieh, and Libby (2002), soil 
quality was measured by the Department of Agriculture’s Land Capability Class.  
Consistent with the theory, soil quality was negatively correlated with the level of 
development.   
In Oakland County, however, soil quality is probably irrelevant to the overall 
level of development.  This is simply because there is little land in agricultural use left in 
the county.  In fact, only 4.4 percent of Oakland’s total land area is in agricultural use, 
and most of this is located in the outlying townships (Oakland County Land Use Statistics 
2002).  It is likely that at some point in the past, soil quality would have been an 
important factor, but this has been eclipsed by the rising value of land for developed uses.  
For this reason, no measure of soil quality is included in the model.   
  The final variable in the model, the average minimum lot size in each community, 
is the focus of this analysis.  What, then, would be the hypothesized relationship between   50
i y (the share, or percentage, of developable land that is developed from 1990-2000) and 
average minimum lot size?  Figure 4 above suggests that this relationship should be “U-
shaped” and quadratic.  Thus, at first, as minimum lot sizes increase,  i y should decrease 
at a decreasing rate.  But then, at some level of minimum lot size to be estimated, 
i y should begin to increase at an increasing rate.  For this reason, a squared average 
minimum lot size explanatory variable is added in order to allow for a quadratic 
relationship.  The point at which this curve is minimized would clearly be an important 
policy issue. 
4.3 Post  Testing 
 
  In any type of model in which the unit of analysis is politically defined (e.g., 
variables defined at the city, village, and township level), one would expect 
heteroskedasticity to be a problem.  This is because government units with jurisdictions 
of unequal sizes are likely to produce non-constant error variances (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld 1998).  Therefore, the initial model will be tested for heteroskedasticity using 
White’s Test.  This is a very general test in that it allows the researcher to test the null 
hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity (i.e., homoskedasticity) without specifying what 
variable or variables are causing the problem.  If the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity 
is rejected, then the model will be re-estimated using White’s heteroskedasticity 
consistent covariance estimator.         
  Because of the relatively small sample size, the central limit theorem might not 
apply.  If this is the case, then the t-test would be inappropriate for hypothesis testing if 
the residuals are not normally distributed.   Therefore the model will also be tested for 
non-normality of residuals using the Jarque-Bera Test (JB Test) (1980).  This is a joint   51
test of the third and forth central moments (i.e., skewness and kurtosis, respectively).  It is 
distributed chi square with two degrees of freedom, and has an expected value of two 
under the null hypothesis of normality.
14   
  The model will then be tested for the presence of spatial autocorrelation using 
Moran’s I statistic (equation 12) as described in Chapter 3.  The spatial weights matrix, 
W , is specified such that the  s ij w ' are equal to 1 if the communities share a border of 
any length or meet at a vertex, and equal to zero otherwise.  The Z score will then be 
calculated and interpreted.  If the model tests positive for spatial autocorrelation, it will 
be corrected using the iterative maximum likelihood algorithm described in Chapter 3.  If 
the model tests positive for both heteroskedasticity and spatial autocorrelation, then a 
robust covariance estimator will be implemented in addition to the iterative maximum 
likelihood method.       
 
      
 
                                                 




















, where N is the 
number of observations.     52
Chapter 5  Data 
 
5.1  Dependent Variable—Land Consumption 
The South Eastern Michigan Council of Governments (SEMCOG) has compiled 
land use and land cover data for the seven counties in the SEMCOG region for the years 
1990 and 2000 (2004).  Raw data from the Michigan Resource Inventory System 
(MIRIS) is updated by SEMCOG and tabulated into charts.  The major land use 
categories included in the data set are: residential, under development, 
commercial/office/institutional, industrial, transportation, communication/utility, 
extractive/barren, cultural/outdoor recreation/cemetery, agricultural land/farmsteads, 
grass and shrub land, forest land, water, and wetland.  These categories and their sub-
categories are listed in Appendix Table 5.  Appendix Table 6 gives the year 1990 and 
2000 acreage in each category for the entire county.      
Tabulated land use data is available for both 1990 and 2000 for 59 of the 61 cities, 
villages, and townships in Oakland County.  This data was used to calculate the 
dependent variable as is described in Chapter 4.  Using the land use and land cover 
categories listed above, the data was first aggregated into three groups—developed land, 
undeveloped land, and undevelopable land.   The developed land group includes all land 
categorized as residential, under development, commercial/office/institutional, industrial, 
transportation, communication/utility, and extractive/barren.  In addition, two of the three 
sub-categories of cultural/outdoor recreation/cemetery, specifically cemetery and public 
assembly/cultural/sports facility, were also included as developed uses.  All other 
categories except water and wetland are considered undeveloped uses.  The water and 
wetland categories are considered undevelopable.  For the case of wetlands, this is   53
because state and federal legislation prevents most infill of wetlands.  Water, of course, is 
inherently not developable.
15  This is significant because approximately 6 percent (some 
35,000 acres) of Oakland County’s total area is covered by water.    
Three of the communities—Ferndale, Keego Harbor, and Sylvan Lake—had to be 
removed from the data set because the change in acres developed from 1990 to 2000 was 
negative.  Changes in developed acres for these three communities were only slightly 
below zero, and probably reflect the demolishing of a few developed uses.  Because the 
natural logarithm of a negative number is undefined, these three observations were 
dropped.  Also, the two communities that SEMCOG does not provide land use data for—
specifically Novi Township and Southfield Township—were dropped due to lack of data.                    
5.2  Explanatory Control Variables 
 
Various economic, geographic and demographic variables are hypothesized to 
have an effect on the rate of land development in any given area.  The control variables 
included in this analysis are: median household income, per pupil spending, criminal 
offenses committed per capita, local tax burden, mean travel time to work, distance to 
population center (Detroit), and population density.  Brief descriptions and summary 









                                                 
15 It may be that the barren and extractive land use categories are also inherently undevelopable.  However, 
Appendix Table 6 shows that these two uses are relatively small in Oakland County, and including them in 
the undevelopable category did not change the model results significantly.     54








DEP  Natural log of the ratio 
of the % of acres 
developed from 1990-
2000 to the % of acres 
not developed 
 
-1.56 1.75  -7.26/2.43 
TAXBURD  Average Certified Tax 

















CRIME  Index Offenses Per 
Capita, 2000 
 
0.02 0.01  0.004/0.07 
POPDEN  People Per Square Mile, 
Average of 1990 and 
2000 
 
2,324.19 1,910.44  102.86/7469.29 
TRAVTIME  Mean Travel Time to 
Work, Average of 1990 
and 2000 
 
26.16 3.99  20.25/34.25 
DISTDET  Driving Distance to 
Detroit in Miles 
 
32.42 12.57  10.6/56.6 
HINC Median  Household 
Income ($), Average of 
1990 and 2000 
 
67,281.86 27,541.07 22,766.12/184,395.70 
WAMLS Weighted  Average 
Minimum Lot Size, 
Acres 
 
51,261.89 79,105.1  4,386.86/312,816.8 
For N = 54 observations. 
Median household income data was acquired from both the 1990 and the 2000 US 
Census (U.S. Census Fact Sheet 2000).  Median household income figures for 2000 are 
based on 1999 income figures and therefore are calculated in year 1999 dollars.  Median 
household income figures for 1990 are similarly reported by the Census in 1989 dollars.  
In calculating the variable, the 1989 data was first inflated to 1999 dollars using the   55
consumer price index.  This was then averaged with the 1999 figures to form average 
median household income for the time period 1990-2000.       
Similarly, population density was calculated for both 1990 and 2000 from the US 
Census (U.S. Census Fact Sheet 2000).  These were then averaged to compute average 
population density from 1990-2000.  Area figures for each community come from the 
GIS based Oakland County Land Use Statistics (Oakland County Land Use Statistics 
2002).     
The distance to population center variable was calculated as the driving distance 
in miles from each community’s center to Downtown Detroit.  This was computed by 
using Microsoft Streets and Trips 2002 software.  This program is essentially an 
electronic road atlas that easily provides data on driving distance by major roads between 
any two points in the database.  When only the name of the community is specified (and 
not any specific address) the program automatically makes its calculations from the 
geographic center of each community.  Its algorithm chooses the route from each 
community’s center to Downtown Detroit that has the shortest drive time.               
Data describing mean travel time to work (in minutes) was obtained from both the 
1990 and 2000 United States Census (U.S. Census Fact Sheet 2000).  These were 
averaged to obtain mean travel time to work from 1990 to 2000.  This variable should 
effectively capture two things that the distance to Detroit variable does not.  First, 
because the unit of measure is time, it accounts for traffic congestion.  Second, it also 
accounts for the fact that many individuals that drive to work do not work in Detroit.     
A two variable system of categorical variables describing whether each 
community is a township, city, or village was also constructed in order to control for any   56
variance that may result from such classifications.  The first variable--labeled CTYDUM 
for City Dummy--equals 1 if the community is a city and 0 otherwise.  The second 
variable--labeled VILDUM for Village Dummy--similarly equals 1 if the community is a 
village and 0 otherwise.  Therefore, if both categorical variables equal 0, the community 
is a township.      
It is also important to control for certain aspects of quality of life.  Specifically, 
the model includes variables that account for the effects of crime rates, the quality of 
elementary education, and the level of taxation.  These variables represent some of the 
push and pull factors commonly hypothesized to affect urban growth patterns.         
The Michigan Uniform Crime Report publishes crime statistics by law 
enforcement agency (i.e., police department) that illustrate both the number of offenses 
committed and the number of arrests made in each jurisdiction (Michigan State Police. 
2001).  They compute an “index” that is the sum of all offenses for murder, rape, robbery, 
aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson.  The offenses index 
for the year 2000 was used for this analysis.   
The problem with the Uniform Crime Report index data is that all communities 
do not have their own police force.  Some share law enforcement agencies and some are 
covered by the County Sheriff’s Office or the Michigan State Police (MSP).  This means 
that the observations on the crime data do not match up with the number of communities.  
For example, the MSP have jurisdiction over three townships—Groveland, Holly, and 
Rose—but only one number, the sum of the offenses for the three townships, is reported.  
Thus, both the Michigan State Police and the Oakland County Sheriff’s Office were 
contacted in order to obtain disaggregations of the index number reported for each.     57
Once these disaggregations were obtained, the index was divided by year 2000 
population in order to compute index offenses per capita.  Thus, year 2000 index offenses 
per capita is the crime rate variable.
16     
Data on per pupil spending for 2002 is available online from Standard and Poor’s 
(School Evaluation Services 2002).
17  This service reports per pupil spending and other 
Michigan educational data by Michigan school district.   
In Oakland County, school district and community borders are not identical.  In 
fact, there are more communities than school districts, and many communities send 
students to more than one school district.  This presents a problem because the rest of the 
data set is reported by community, and therefore the per pupil spending data does not 
match up properly with the observations of the other variables.  This problem was 
overcome by taking the average per pupil spending across the school districts that each 
community has students enrolled in.  For example, if one community sends students to 
four different school districts, then the education variable is the average per pupil 
spending in these four districts.  This assumes implicitly that the communities send equal 
numbers of students to each school district.  This is probably not an accurate assumption, 
but disaggregated enrollment figures were not available.  Theoretically, one would want 
to weight the per pupil spending data by the percent of total students attending each 
school district.     
Tax rate data was acquired from both the 1990 and 2000 Michigan Ad Valorem 
Property Tax Levy Report.  This report provides ad valorem rates in Michigan for 
                                                 
16 An average of 1990 and 2000 index offenses per capita would be preferable to the 2000 index alone.  
However, a disaggregation of the 1990 Uniform Crime Report data set was not available from the Oakland 
County Sheriff’s Department, and therefore year 2000 data was used alone.   
17 Similar to the CRIME variable, no per pupil spending data was readily available for the years 1990 to 
2001, and therefore year 2002 data was used.   58
county, township, city, and village certified taxes as well as for certified taxes based upon 
school district.  These rates are expressed in mills.  Township residents pay a township 
tax rate, city residents pay a city tax rate, and village residents pay both a village tax rate 
and the township tax rate.  These tax rates are known as township certified taxes, city 
certified taxes, and village certified taxes, respectively.  On top of this, all residents pay a 
tax based upon the school district to which they belong.   
The tax burden variable was constructed as follows.  First, because county tax 
rates are equal across the sample, they were not included in the tax variable.  Taxes based 
upon school district affiliation were also not included in the variable.  This is because this 
rate varies within each community in the sample.
18  For example, the City of Farmington 
Hills sends students to three different school districts, each of which has a different tax 
rate.  Therefore, the average of the certified tax rate for each community for the years 
1990 and 2000 is first computed.  Next, a measure of housing value is computed from 
U.S. Census figures by averaging the 2000 median housing value with the 1990 median 
housing value inflated to year 2000 dollars.  This is then multiplied by the average tax 
rate to obtain a measure of average tax burden for each community.   
5.3  Explanatory Zoning Variables 
 
The zoning ordinances of 60 Oakland County communities are available for 
examination from the county government.  By photocopying the “schedule of 
regulations” sections and any similar relevant sections from these ordinances, data on 
minimum lot size restrictions was obtained.  This data was then compiled into a 
spreadsheet to facilitate analysis.   
                                                 
18 Including this school tax variable could also make the tax variable overlap with the education variable 
discussed above.   59
There were several problems with the zoning data that led two of the observations 
to be excluded from the model.  First, the City of Lake Angelus does not have any 
minimum lot size restrictions in its zoning ordinance.  It chooses to regulate density by 
other means, and therefore it was discarded from the model.  Second, the Village of 
Leonard was excluded because no up to date zoning map was available.  Because 
Ferndale, Keego Harbor, Sylvan Lake, Novi Township, and Southfield Township were 
excluded due to problems with the dependent variable, this leaves 54 total observations 
with which to conduct the statistical analysis.       
Most of these remaining 54 communities have more than one single-family 
residential zoning district.  Each of these districts has its own minimum lot size.  Non-
residentially developed areas, such as commercial and industrial districts, are not 
typically regulated by lot size, and therefore the minimum lot size variable is based 
entirely on single-family residential properties.   
For example, a community may have an “R1 District” for low-density single-
family housing, an “R2 District” for medium-density single-family housing, and an “R3 
District” for high-density single-family housing.
19  Thus, it is necessary to transform the 
data to create a weighted average of the minimum lot sizes in each community.  The 
theoretically proper weight is the percentage of total single-family land area zoned for 
each classification.  For instance, 45 percent of available single-family land may be 
zoned for R1, 30 percent for R2, and 25 percent for R3.  Appendix Table 7 lists the 
various minimum lot sizes in each community.    
  
                                                 
19 The number of residential districts in Oakland County communities varies between 1 and 10.  The names 
used to described the zoning districts in each community, e.g., R1 and R2, vary greatly from community to 
community.       60
These weights were acquired using several methods.  First, each community was 
contacted in order to find out how many acres were included in each single-family 
residential zoning classification.  These numbers were then used to calculate the 
percentage of total single-family land area in each zoning classification.  In general, only 
those communities with GIS based zoning maps were able to provide this information.  In 
those cases where this data was not directly available from the community, paper copies 
of zoning maps were acquired.  By overlaying a transparent grid onto these maps, the 
necessary weights were estimated.  These weights were then used to calculate the 
weighted average, the variance, and the standard deviation of minimum lot sizes in each 
community.      61
Chapter 6  Analysis 
6.1 Regression  Output 
 
  The land use share model regression output is reported in Table 10 and includes 
coefficient estimates, standard errors, t-statistics, and p-values.  Logarithmic 
transformations were used on the TAX, TRAVTIME and HINC variables because, when 
plotted against the dependent variable, they appeared to have a log-linear relationship.  
Therefore, the coefficients for these three variables can be interpreted as elasticities.  All 
other explanatory variables are in level form, and their coefficients are interpreted, ceteris 
paribus, as the change in the natural logarithm of the share ratio,  ) 1 ( i y i y − , resulting 
from a one-unit change in the explanatory variable.   
Table 10: Regression Output 
Variable Name  Estimated Coefficient
*  Standard Error  t-Statistic  P-Value 
Intercept 
 
7.52 13.8  0.54  0.59 
LNTAXBURD 
 
0.34 0.42  0.80  0.43 
EDUC 
 
0.00082  0.00023  3.57  0.001 
CRIME 
 
-12.78 16.41  -0.78  0.44 
POPDEN 
 
-0.00096  0.00023  -4.23  0.00 
LNTRAVTIME 
 
9.07  2.35  3.85  0.00 
DISTDET 
 
-0.031 0.033  -0.93  0.36 
LNHINC 
 
-3.93  1.15  -3.40  0.001 
WAMLS 
 




8.96e-11  3.72e-11  2.41  0.02 
*To find the mean marginal effects, 
i dX
dy , as discussed in Chapter 3.3.2, multiply each coefficient 
estimate by  ()151 . 0 ˆ 1 ˆ = − y y . 
54 = N ,  62 . 0 2 = R ,  54 . 0 2 = R , Model 85 . 7 = F  
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  Overall, the fit of the model is good.  The
2 R  is equal to 0.62 and the adjusted
2 R  
is 0.54.  The model F statistic is also significant at the one percent level (p-value = 
0.000), and hence the hypothesis that as a whole the explanatory variables have zero 
explanatory power is rejected.  Six of the nine explanatory variables are significant at the 
five percent level.  Of these six, five are significant at the one percent level as well.   
Before interpreting the estimated coefficients, it should be noted that several 
explanatory variables discussed in previous chapters are missing from the model.  First, 
an attempt was made to measure any possible zoning spillover effects that may exist in 
Oakland County.  These effects were discussed at length in Chapter 3.  Both of these 
variables, SPILL and SPILL
2 respectively, were not included in the final regression 
output (Table 10) because they were not statistically significant.  For each community in 
the sample, this variable consisted of a weighted average of the WAMLS variables of 
each neighboring community.  Neighbors were defined as they were when the spatial 
weights matrix was specified—any community that meets another at a vertex or a border 
is considered a neighbor.  Weights were constructed as the percent of total land area in 
single-family residential use in each neighboring community.  A squared term was also 
included on the hypothesis that a quadratic relationship similar to that estimated for 
WAMLS may exist.  If spillovers exist, then the minimum lot size restrictions of 
neighboring communities should have an affect on the dependent variable.  The 
regression output with these variables included appears in Appendix Table 8. 
  The two categorical variables (CTYDUM and VILDUM) described in Chapter 5 
are also noticeably missing from the model output.  These two variables were dropped 
because they were statistically insignificant and therefore added little to the model   63
specification.  The same is also true of the standard deviation and variance variables that 
were calculated from the minimum lot size data.  Both were insignificant, and thus one 
can conclude that the amount that minimum lot sizes are dispersed about the mean does 
not have a statistically significant effect on land development. 
  We fail to reject the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity.  Specifically, 
White’s general heteroskedasticity statistic yielded a p-value of 0.44, and therefore there 
is no need to implement White’s heteroskedasticity consistent covariance correction.   
  The model also tested negative for spatial autocorrelation.  Specifically, Moran’s I 
was computed as 0.084 (expected value of 0).  This produced a p-value of 0.93.  Given 
this value, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation.  It was 
therefore unnecessary to correct for spatial autocorrelation in the model’s error term.   
  The Jarque-Bera test results indicate that the model residuals are approximately 
normally distributed.  Specifically, skewness and kurtosis of the residuals were estimated 
as 0.42 and 2.88, respectively (the expected values of the third and forth moment are 0 
and 3).  These values produced a chi squared distributed test statistic of 1.59 that 
corresponds to a p-value of 0.45.  Similar normality tests also failed to produce evidence 
of non-normality.   
6.2  Discussion of Results 
 
Once again, six of the nine explanatory variables are statistically significant.  
These variables are per pupil spending, population density, mean travel time to work, 
median household income, and both the squared and non squared weighted average 
minimum lot size variables.  The three variables that are not statistically significant are 
crime rate, tax burden, and distance to Detroit.     64
Given the primary purpose of this research—to investigate the relationship 
between minimum lot sizes and land development—it is of greatest importance that both 
the squared and the non-squared minimum lot size variables are significant.  Specifically, 
the non-squared term is negative while the squared term is positive.  This leads to the “U-
shaped” parabolic relationship described in Panel A of Figure 6.   
The point at which this curve is minimized can be found relatively easily.   First, 
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Setting equation 21 equal to zero and solving for WAMLS yields a minimum lot size of 
approximately 5.15 acres (224,330 square feet).
20  It is at this point that the percentage 
change in developed acreage from 1990-2000,  i y , begins to increase with minimum lot 
size.  This is a relatively large figure, as only four of the communities considered in this 
                                                 
20 The bars on the observed variables represent the fact that each variable was evaluated at its sample mean.     65
analysis exceed it.
21  This is an important result for policy purposes because it shows that 
only these four communities (of a total of 54 in Oakland County) have minimum lot size 
zoning constraints that are large enough to actually increase the rate of land development.   
  This relationship is easy to portray graphically.  First, evaluate equation 20 at the 
sample means of all variables except WAMLS and WAMLS2 using the estimated 
coefficients.  Second, by substituting into the resulting expression the range of data on 
WAMLS (0.1—9.2 acres) at a relatively small increment (e.g., 0.2 acres) we can plot the 
quadratic relationship between WAMLS and i y .  This is pictured in Figure 9.  
Essentially, this is a graph of the relationship between minimum lot size and 
development, holding all else constant.    
Figure 8: Estimated Relationship between Development and Minimum Lot Size 
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21 The communities are: Addison Township, Bloomfield Township, Highland Township, and Oxford 
Township   66
The coefficient signs of the control variables are also of policy importance, and 
their interpretations follow.  First, the median household income variable is significant 
and has a negative coefficient.  This matches with the hypothesis that in areas where 
income is higher, individuals use their wealth to protect their communities from 
development.   
  Second, the per pupil spending variable is also significant, and has a positive 
coefficient.  This is consistent with the theory that education quality is a push-pull factor.  
Communities with higher quality education are producing a service that makes them a 
more attractive place to live, and thus they have higher levels of development.   
  The crime variable, index offenses per capita, has a negative coefficient, but is not 
statistically significant.  The coefficient sign is as expected, and thus signals that areas 
with higher crime rates will have less development, ceteris paribus, because people 
prefer to live in as safe a neighborhood as possible.  This variable’s lack of statistical 
significance may be a result of it being based on year 2000 data, rather than the more 
desirable average of 1990 and 2000.  Crime rates in the year 2000 should not have a 
statistical influence on land development from 1990 to 2000 unless they are essentially 
constant over that same period.           
  The tax burden coefficient is estimated as positive, but it is statistically not 
significant.  This positive relationship may result from the fact that rapidly developing 
areas typically require more revenue per capita because they must make expensive up 
front investments in infrastructure.  However, this variable has numerous possible effects, 
and it is difficult to interpret it, especially given that it is not statistically significant.  A 
more relevant tax variable may be one that captures the amount of services provided per   67
citizen per tax dollar.  Given such a measure, a plausible hypothesis is that communities 
that provide more services per tax dollar collected will develop more quickly.     
  Mean travel time to work has a positive and statistically significant coefficient 
estimate.  Theoretically, one would expect a negative relationship here because long 
commutes are a disincentive to growth; they make traveling to work more expensive.  
One possible explanation for this result is that travel time to work could be associated 
with the price of land, a variable that is not included in the model.  All else equal, the 
price of land declines as one moves away from the city.  So, people with longer 
commutes will tend to live on lower cost land.  This possible relationship between travel 
time and land price may be the cause of the positive relationship between travel time and 
development.   
  The distance to Detroit coefficient is estimated as negative, although it is not 
significant.  The sign is consistent with the monocentric city model in which areas further 
away from the city center are less developed (and develop more slowly) than closer areas.  
However, there is some debate about whether or not the monocentric city model is still 
relevant in modern, American cities.  This is because in most modern cities, the 
traditional downtown area is no longer the only center of employment.  The lack of 
statistical significance of this variable may thus signal the existence of other, satellite 
centers of employment and activity in and around Oakland County.  For example, there is 
also a great deal of business and industry in the cities of Troy and Southfield, and it is 
also possible that people living in the northern part of the County may commute to jobs in 
the Flint area.           68
  Population density was the most significant of the nine explanatory variables in 
the model.  Its coefficient was estimated as negative, signaling that population is most 
dense in areas that experienced little development from 1990 to 2000.  This may be the 
result of two factors.  First, areas with high population density will in general have less 
undeveloped land available, and thus there is a physical constraint on development 
possibilities.  Second, it may simply be that individuals prefer to develop in areas with 
lower population densities (perhaps because of increased benefits from privacy and 
environmental amenities, or possibly because less dense areas have fewer constraints to 
development).  Preferences certainly play a strong part in the process of urban growth 
and development.   
   69
Chapter 7  Summary and Conclusions 
 
  This paper has discussed the theoretical causes of sprawl style development and 
focused on one type of public policy, minimum lot size zoning, which has been 
hypothesized to affect the rate of land development.  Results of the land use share 
multiple regression model have shown that in Oakland County development is a 
quadratic function of average minimum lot size.  At first, as average minimum lot size in 
a community increases, the rate of development declines because minimum lot sizes deter 
growth by limiting the number of households that are able to participate in the market for 
residential property.  But as minimum lot size increases, the rate of land development will 
actually begin to increase due to the increase in per capita consumption that larger 
minimum lot sizes entail.  At average minimum lot sizes of greater than 5.15 acres 
(224,330 square feet), minimum lot size begins to increase the rate of development.   
  The results of this research clearly have policy relevance.  They show that 
minimum lot sizes of greater than 5.15 acres can actually increase the rate of 
development, and therefore they cease to be of value as a policy tool for controlling the 
rate of land development, and may even exacerbate sprawl.  Certain communities with 
very large lot sizes that are meant to control growth may actually be making the problem 
worse by using large lot zoning.  Planning and zoning officials in the cities, villages, and 
townships of Oakland County could consider this result when making future decisions 
about minimum lot size regulations.  
  The results also support theory regarding the other various factors that affect land 
use change.  Estimates of the effects of push-pull factors like education quality, crime 
rate, and tax burden on development have the proper hypothesized signs, although only   70
the education variable is significant.  Explanatory variables describing household income, 
commute time, and population density are also shown to be significant.      
However, because the project’s scope was limited to Oakland County, it is 
difficult to generalize the results to other rapidly urbanizing areas in Michigan.  A similar 
but larger study area that encompassed all Michigan counties experiencing rapid 
suburbanization would certainly be of even greater value.  This would allow for more 
general policy conclusions to be made about the effects of minimum lot size zoning on 
development.   
  The major problem with such a study would obviously be data availability and the 
difficulties associated with standardizing data from many different sources.  Up to date 
land use and land cover data is simply not available for many Michigan communities and 
the time involved with standardizing minimum lot size information would also be 
considerable.  There would also be numerous problems in obtaining and standardizing the 
data on the control variables.       
  A significant limitation of this model is that it fails to consider the possibility that 
minimum lot size zoning may not be an exogenous variable.  Statistical studies of zoning 
have often been criticized because of the assumption that zoning regulations are handed 
down exogenously from some external source (Fischel 1990).  In fact, it is likely that 
zoning is endogenously determined, and therefore different statistical methods (e.g., 
instrumental variables estimation) should be used to account for this.  Further research is 
thus needed to examine the possibility of endogenous zoning and its statistical 
implications.   71
  It would also be useful to further examine the possibility that zoning spillovers 
occur between neighboring communities.  While this research finds no statistically 
significant evidence of such a relationship for Oakland County, it may be that these 
spillovers exist elsewhere in Michigan.  A finding that these spillovers did exist would 
certainly be important information for policy makers at the local level, in that it would 
imply a need for greater communication and coordination among the planning and zoning 
agencies of neighboring communities.       
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Appendix Table 1: Oakland County Projected Population Growth Rates 
   Population    
Community 1990  2000 
2030 
(Expected)% Growth Expected 2000-2030
Oakland County  1,083,592 1,194,156 1,333,573 11.7%
Addison Twp.  4785 6107 9440 54.6%
Auburn Hills  17076 19873 21013 5.7%
Berkley 16960 15531 13552 -12.7%
Beverly Hills Village  10643 10437 10352 -0.8%
Bingham Farms Village  1001 1030 967 -6.1%
Birmingham 19997 19291 17800 -7.7%
Bloomfield Hills  4288 3940 3710 -5.8%
Bloomfield Twp  42473 43023 39180 -8.9%
Brandon Twp  10799 13230 18509 39.9%
Clarkston 1005 962 957 -0.5%
Clawson 13874 12732 10654 -16.3%
Commerce Twp  22228 30349 41019 35.2%
Farmington 10132 10423 10317 -1.0%
Farmington Hills  74652 82111 76823 -6.4%
Ferndale 25026 22105 17880 -19.1%
Franklin Village  2644 2937 2793 -4.9%
Groveland Twp  4705 6150 7239 17.7%
Hazel Park  20051 18963 15860 -16.4%
Highland Twp  17941 19169 21681 13.1%
Holly Twp  3257 3902 7167 83.7%
Holly Village  5595 6135 6790 10.7%
Huntington Woods  6336 6151 5595 -9.0%
Independence Twp  23717 32581 38103 17.0%
Keego Harbor  2932 2769 2805 1.3%
Lake Angelus  328 326 264 -19.0%
Lake Orion Village  3029 2715 2916 7.4%
Lathrup Village  4329 4236 3863 -8.8%
Leonard Village  357 332 332 0.0%
Lyon Twp  8695 11041 49076 344.5%
Madison Heights  32196 31101 26564 -14.6%
Milford Twp  6610 8999 11235 24.9%
Milford Village  5511 6272 6685 6.6%
Northville (Part)  3367 3352 3156 -5.9%
Novi (and Novi Twp)  33148 47579 79264 66.6%
Oak Park  30462 29793 25634 -14.0%
Oakland Twp  8227 13071 26083 99.6%
Orchard Lake  2286 2215 2216 0.1%
Orion Twp  21047 30748 40948 33.2%
Ortonville Village  1252 1535 1830 19.2%
Oxford Twp  9004 12485 25884 107.3%
Oxford Village  2929 3540 3546 0.2%
Pleasant Ridge  2833 2594 2375 -8.4%
Pontiac 71166 66337 75544 13.9%
Rochester 7178 10467 11126 6.3%  74
Rochester Hills  61718 68825 72585 5.5%
Rose Twp  4926 6210 8933 43.9%
Royal Oak  65493 60062 52233 -13.0%
Royal Oak Twp  5011 5446 5399 -0.9%
South Lyon  6612 10036 13871 38.2%
Southfield (and Southfield Twp)  75695 78322  73671 -5.9%
Springfield Twp  9927 13338 20326 52.4%
Sylvan Lake  1893 1735 1523 -12.2%
Troy 72884 80959 77046 -4.8%
Walled Lake  6278 6713 6992 4.2%
Waterford Twp  66692 73150 72863 -0.4%
West Bloomfield Twp  54507 64860 66986 3.3%
White Lake Twp  22608 28219 34313 21.6%
Wixom 8550 13263 24484 84.6%
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Appendix Table 2: Summary Statistics of SEMCOG Population Growth Projections for 
Oakland County 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum
1990 Population  18,3766.0 21,945.7  328  75,695 
2000 Population  20,240.5 23,329.3  326  82,111 
Expected 2030 Population  22,607.6 24,292.6  264  79,264 
Expected Percent Growth 2000-
2030 
17.7% 52.4%  -19.1%  344.5% 
 
Appendix Table 3: Summary Statistics of SEMCOG Population Growth Projections for 
Oakland County’s Outlying Areas 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum
1990 Population  9,315.6 8,247.7  357  33,148 
2000 Population  12,230.3 11,597.3  332  47,579 
Expected 2030 Population  18,380.5 18,436.2  332  79,264 
Expected Percent Growth 2000-
2030 
43.1% 67.3%  -12.2%  344.5% 
 
Appendix Table 4: Summary Statistics of SEMCOG Population Growth Projections for 
Oakland County’s Southeastern Area 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum
1990 Population  26,540.5 26,914.7  328  75,695 
2000 Population  27,475.6 28,586.8  326  82,111 
Expected 2030 Population  26,425.6 28,342.1  264  77,076 
Expected Percent Growth 2000-
2030 
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Appendix Table 5: SEMCOG Land Use/Cover Categories and Subcategories 
Land Use/Cover Category  Subcategories 
Residential  Multiple-Family Residential/High Rise; Multiple-Family 
Residential/Low Rise; Single-Family Residential/Duplex; Manufactured 
Home Park 
 
Under Development  Developing Single-Family Residential; Developing Undefined 
 
Commercial/Office/Institutional Primary/Central  Business District; Shopping Center/Malls/Retail 
Centers; Secondary Mixed Business Area; Institutional Establishment; 
Office/Research Center or Park; Vacant Commercial 
 
Industrial  General Industrial; Industrial Park; Automotive Test Track Roadway; 
Vacant Industrial 
 
Transportation  Air Transportation Facility; Runway; Rail Transportation Facility; Rail 
Road Track; Water Transportation Facility; Road Transportation 
Facility; Roadway 
 
Communication/Utility  Communication; Utility; Electrical Transmission Line; Gas Pipeline and 
Storage; Oil Pipeline and Storage; Solid Waste Disposal Site; Sewage 
Treatment and Transmission; Water Treatment and Transmission 
 
Extractive/Barren  Open Pit/Above Ground Extractive; Sand and Gravel Pit; Underground 








Agricultural Land/Farmstead  Cropland; Orchard/Bush Fruit/Vineyard/Ornamental Horticulture; 
Confined Feeding Operation; Permanent Pasture; Other Agricultural 
Land; Farmstead 
 
Grass and Shrub Land  Herbaceous Open Land; Shrub Land 
 
Forest Land  Northern Hardwood; Central Hardwood/Oak; Aspen/White Birch; Pine; 
Other Upland Conifer; Christmas Tree Plantation 
 
Water  Stream and Waterway; Lake; Reservoir 
 
Wetland  Shrub/Scrub Wetland; Lowland Hardwood; Lowland Conifer; Mixed 
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Appendix Table 6: Acreage in Each SEMCOG Land Use/Cover Category for Oakland 
County as a Whole 







194,840 230,893  36,053 
Under Development 
 
7,195 9,674 2,479 
Commercial/Office/Institutional 
 
29,504 33,366  3,862 
Industrial 
 
15,777 18,961  3,184 
Transportation 
 
7446 7,642  196 
Communication/Utility 
 
2,462 2,275  -187 
Extractive/Barren 
 




17,879 22,787  4,908 
Agricultural Land/Farmstead 
 
66,603 42,920 -23,683 
Grass and Shrub Land 
 
95,460 70,799 -24,661 
Forest Land 
 
50,028 47,089 -2,939 
Water 
 
27,674 28,310  636 
Wetland 
 
58,517 58,362  -155 
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Appendix Table 7:  Minimum Lot Size Restrictions for Each Community 
Community Name  Lot Sizes in Acres 
Addison Twp  10, 5, 3, 2, 1, 0.57, 0.28 
Auburn Hills  0.46, 0.19, 0.17, 0.15, 0.14 
Berkley  0.28, 0.2, 0.15, 0.1 
Beverly Hills Village  0.57, 0.37, 0.28, 0.2, 0.14 
Bingham Farms Village 1.4, 0.7, 0.4, 0.23 
Birmingham  0.21, 0.46, 0.14, 0.1 
Bloomfield Hills  2, 1.5, 1, 1, 0.75 
Bloomfield Twp  0.69, 0.5, 0.46, 0.37 
Brandon Twp  2.5, 1, 0.46, 0.34 
Clarkston 0.37,  0.28 
Clawson 0.12 
Commerce Twp  0.46, 0.29 
Farmington  0.41, 0.34, 0.29, 0.23, 0.19 
Farmington Hills  0.68, 0.54, 0.41, 0.34, 0.23, 0.2 
Franklin Village  3, 1.5, 0.69, 0.52, 0.34, 0.28 
Groveland Twp  10, 2.5, 1, 0.69 
Hazel Park  0.14, 0.12 
Highland Twp  10, 5, 3, 1.5, 0.5, 0.32 
Holly Village  0.28, 0.17 
Holly Twp  5, 2.5, 1.5, 1, 0.5 
Huntington Woods  0.69, 0.21, 0.16, 0.14, 0.12 
Independence Twp  3, 1.5, 1, 0.34 
Lake Orion Village  0.19, 0.18, 0.17 
Lathrup Village  0.21 
Lyon Twp  2.5, 1, 0.5, 0.34 
Madison Heights  1, 0.17, 0.13 
Milford Village  0.5, 0.34, 0.22, 0.2, 0.17 
Milford Twp  3, 1.5, 0.28 
Northville (Part)  0.28, 0.17 
Novi  1, 0.5, 0.41, 0.28, 0.23 
Oak Park  0.14 
Oakland Twp  2.3, 1.7, 1.38, 1, 0.9, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5, 0.45, 0.38 
Orchard Lake  1.38, 0.92, 0.46, 0.34 
Orion Twp  2.5, 1.5, 0.69, 0.32, 0.25, 0.19 
Ortonville Village  0.34, 0.28 
Oxford Village  0.29, 0.22, 0.17 
Oxford Twp  20, 10, 5, 2.5, 1, 0.57, 0.28 
Pleasant Ridge  0.1 
Pontiac 0.14 
Rochester  0.34, 0.22, 0.19, 0.17, 0.14 
Rochester Hills  0.46, 0.34, 0.28, 0.22 
Rose Twp  10, 5, 1.5, 1, 0.5 
Royal Oak  0.14, 0.3 
Royal Oak Twp  0.14, 0.09 
South Lyon  0.34, 0.28, 0.23, 0.2 
Southfield  0.46, 0.21, 0.17 
Springfield Twp  2.5, 1.5, 1, 0.5   79
Troy  0.69, 0.5, 0.34, 0.24, 0.19, 0.17 
Walled Lake  0.28, 0.22 
Waterford Twp  1, 0.28, 0.23, 0.21 
West Bloomfield Twp  0.34, 0.29, 0.23 
White Lake Twp  5, 2, 1, 0.46, 0.37, 0.28 
Wixom  0.34, 0.29, 0.17 
Wolverine Lake Village 0.28, 0.21, 0.17 
 
Appendix Table 8: Regression Output with Spillover Variables 
Variable Name  Estimated Coefficient  Standard Error  t-Statistic  P-Value 
Intercept 
 
11.37 14.6  0.78  0.44 
LNTAXBURD 
 
0.36 0.44  0.83  0.41 
EDUC 
 
0.00085  0.00024  3.61  0.001 
CRIME 
 
-15.65 17.05  -0.92  0.36 
POPDEN 
 
-0.00099  0.00023  -4.26  0.00 
LNTRAVTIME 
 
8.57  2.45  3.50  0.00 
DISTDET 
 
-0.030 0.035  -0.87  0.39 
LNHINC 
 
-4.19  1.21  -3.45  0.001 
WAMLS 
 
-3.93e-5  1.22e-5  -3.21  0.003 
WAMLS2 
 
8.73e-11  3.78e-11  2.31  0.026 













54 = N ,  62 . 0 2 = R ,  53 . 0 2 = R , Model 35 . 6 = F  
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